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T was the best of times, it was the worst of times, as Charles Dickens
might have said. The best? A budget surplus. The worst? Trying to
divide all that "extra" money among so many good causes and con-
stituents. The result? A state tax bill that provides significant sales tax
and franchise tax changes, as well as some significant property tax
changes. Those legislative changes, as well as several significant judicial
and administrative decisions, once again changed the Texas tax landscape.
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A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
Texas taxpayers were often on the winning side when it came to statu-
tory construction of the Tax Code by the courts. In Rylander v. Associ-
ated Technics Co.,' the court of appeals refused to accept the
comptroller's narrow construction of the tax exemption provided for re-
moval of hazardous waste. The taxpayer in this case provided asbestos-
abatement services, including asbestos removal services, without charging
sales tax.2 The comptroller argued that asbestos is not hazardous waste
until it is removed from a building. Based on this conclusion, the comp-
troller classified the services provided by the taxpayer as two separate
services, describing the separation of the asbestos from the building as
real property repair and remodeling, a taxable service, and treating the
removal of the asbestos from the property as removal of hazardous waste,
a separate nontaxable service. The taxpayer argued that the entire ser-
vice was hazardous waste removal and therefore not taxable. The district
court agreed with the taxpayer.
The court of appeals affirmed the taxpayer's victory based on statutory
construction. The court determined, as a matter of fact, that the asbestos-
abatement process was a continuous process rather than two separate ac-
tivities. 3 Thus, the remaining issue before the court was whether this ac-
tivity qualified for the hazardous-waste tax exemption.4 Of the factors
used to determine a statute's proper construction, the court focused on
the object sought to be attained by the legislature and the administrative
construction of the statute.5 The court maintained that the purpose of the
tax exemption for hazardous waste removal was to encourage the re-
moval of asbestos and therefore control and minimize the public's expo-
sure to asbestos. 6 The comptroller's interpretation of the statute
effectively removed this tax incentive, which was clearly provided by the
legislature. In reviewing the administrative construction of the statute,
the court found the comptroller's interpretation to be unreasonable as
contrary to the clear intent of the statute. 7 The case is significant not only
for its factual holding, but also because it demonstrates the court's recog-
nition that the comptroller can go too far in asserting that a nontaxable
service has taxable components. 8
1. 987 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet. h.).
2. See id. at 947-48. Asbestos-abatement services generally include asbestos removal.
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-3a, § 2(2) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
3. See Associated Technics, 987 S.W.2d at 950.
4. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0048(a)(3)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
5. See Associated Technics, 987 S.W.2d at 950. The other factors mentioned by the
court include the legislative history, the circumstances under which the statute was en-
acted, the title, preamble, and emergency provisions of the law, the common law or former
statutory provisions, and the consequences of a particular construction. See id.
6. See id. (citing 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 295.31 (1998)).
7. See id. at 950-51.
8. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 35,578 (Oct. 5, 1998) as an example of
the lengths to which the Tax Division may go in asserting that a nontaxable item contains a
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In another statutory construction case, the Texas Supreme Court re-
versed the lower court's ruling against the taxpayer. Fleming Foods of
Texas, Inc. v. Rylander9 involved the ability of a taxpayer that paid sales
tax to a vendor to request a tax refund directly from the state without
obtaining an assignment of refund rights from the vendor. In this case,
the taxpayer had agreed to extensions of the statute of limitations for
several periods during an audit. These extensions specifically provided
that the extension of time also applied to the taxpayer's ability to receive
refunds or credits for those same periods. Under these agreements, the
taxpayer timely filed refunds for sales taxes that it claimed it had errone-
ously paid to vendors on exempt packing materials. The comptroller's
office denied a portion of these claims based on its assertion that since
the vendors, through which these taxes were paid, had not timely as-
signed their refund rights to the taxpayer, the refunds were barred by the
four-year statute of limitations. 10 The taxpayer correctly argued that
under the clear language of the statute, it was a taxpayer and was allowed
to seek refunds directly from the state regardless of whether it received
assignments from the vendors."'
The statutory issue raised in this case involved a review of the former
article 1.11A,12 the predecessor to the Tax Code section at issue. The
predecessor statute provided that only those paying tax directly to the
state could request a refund.13 Based on former article 1.11A, the comp-
troller promulgated rules that prohibited a request for refund to be filed
by a taxpayer who had paid the tax through a vendor, requiring instead
taxable and a nontaxable component. In this case, the tax division conceded that an enema
solution is exempt, but asserted that the container it came in is taxable. Fortunately, the
administrative law judge recognized that the tax division's position "defies common sense."
(This lengthy decision addresses numerous examples of exempt drugs, medicines, and pros-
thetic devices.) All cited Texas Comptroller decisions are available on the Internet at
<http://www.cpa.state.tx.us>.
9. 6 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 1999). The initial opinion, which was delivered on June 10,
1999, was withdrawn and replaced by this current opinion, which addresses the amici (in-
cluding ten members of the 79th Legislature), with no substantive changes.
10. The disallowed refunds were those on which the taxpayer's vendors executed the
assignment of refund rights either more than four years after the tax was paid or after the
taxpayer's extension agreements with the comptroller had expired. See infra note 129 and
accompanying text for a discussion of relevant legislative changes that prospectively allow
certain "indirect taxpayers" to seek a refund from the state. Thus, Fleming Foods' signifi-
cance is primarily its impact on pre-1999 legislation periods and on its articulation of statu-
tory construction principles in the context of legislative language that is inconsistent with
explicit legislative intent.
11. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.104(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000). The trial court ren-
dered a take-nothing judgment against the taxpayer, which the court of appeals affirmed.
See Fleming Foods of Tex., Inc. v. Sharp, 951 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997). For
another interesting discussion of refund claims in the context of "who paid the tax?," see
Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 31,865 (May 21, 1999) (focusing on sales taxes owed
in connection with leases that had been assigned; the administrative law judge observed
that the case "represents the point where legal fictions collide with the reality of proof, or,
the lack thereof.")
12. See Act of Apr. 5, 1979, 66th Leg., R.S., ch. 59, § 1, art. 1.11A(1), 1979 Tex. Gen.
Laws 96, 96, repealed by Act of May 29, 1981, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 389, § 39, 1981 Tex. Gen.




that such refund request be made directly to the vendor.14 Although the
legislature stated that the promulgation of the Tax Code was for recodifi-
cation purposes only and that no substantive changes were intended,15
the legislature did change the wording of the statute when it codified the
provision in the Tax Code; as revised, the statute no longer required di-
rect payment to the state as a prerequisite to requesting a refund of sales
tax.16 Thus, the court held that the current statute on its face clearly and
unambiguously allows a taxpayer to file a refund claim with the comptrol-
ler even if the tax was originally collected through a vendor.17
The court's decision is significant both because it reversed the comp-
troller's long-standing refusal to honor refund requests from indirect tax-
payers and because it focused so carefully on statutory analysis.
Although the court of appeals had concluded that the doctrine of legisla-
tive acceptance supported the comptroller's interpretation," 8 the supreme
court rejected this conclusion on the ground that there was a "substantial
change in verbiage" when former article 1.11A(3) was codified in section
111.104 and also because the statute was not ambiguous. 19 Significantly,
the court explained that "[c]itizens, lawyers who represent them, judges,
and members of the Legislature should not be required to research the
law that preceded every codification .... We must be able to accept and
to rely upon the words written by the Legislature" if the words are clear
and do not produce absurd results. 20 The court noted that a review of
prior law, legislative history, and the circumstances under which the cur-
rent law was enacted 21 cannot be used to construe an unambiguous stat-
ute to mean something other than what it plainly says.22 Although the
change in the language upon the codification of former article 1.11A into
sections 111.104 and 111.107 was contrary to the legislature's mandate
with respect to codification, the court stated that by adopting these stat-
utes the legislature expressly repealed former article 1.11A.23 The court,
in its revised opinion, addressed the claim of amici who argued that if an
inadvertent substantive change were made in the codification process, the
old law, rather than the new law, should apply.24 Rejecting this argu-
ment, the Court stated that "[f]ar more harm would occur if we were to
14. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.325(b) (1999). All current, cited rules from the
Texas Administrative Code are available on the Internet at <http//www.cpa.state.tx.us>.
15. See Act of May 29, 1981, 67th Leg., R.S., ch. 389, § 40, 1.981 Tex Gen. Laws 1490,
1787.
16. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.104 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
17. See Fleming Foods, 6 S.W.3d at 280.
18. The doctrine of legislative acceptance provides that if an ambiguous statute has
been construed by the proper administrative officers and it is subsequently re-enacted
without any substantial change, it will ordinarily be given the same construction. See id. at
282 (citing Sharp v. House of Lloyd, Inc., 815 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1991)).
19. Id. at 282.
20. Id. at 285.
21. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (Vernon 1998), made applicable through
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 101.002(a) (Vernon 1992).
22. See Fleming Foods, 6 S.W.3d at 283-84.




hold that prior, repealed law overrides a subsequent, unambiguous
codification. 25
In Residential Information Services Ltd. Partnership v. Rylander,2 6 the
court of appeals affirmed the comptroller's successful motion for sum-
mary judgment against the taxpayer for sales tax due on a payment made
for the early termination of a computer equipment lease. The taxpayer in
this case claimed that a lump sum payment made at the end of the lease
was either a penalty paid for releasing future contractual obligations (an
intangible benefit and therefore not taxable) or a stand-alone payment
separate from the underlying lease (also nontaxable). The appellate
court rejected the taxpayer's first argument by stating that a termination
payment reflects the additional amount due on the lease, taking into ac-
count the shortened lease period, and is therefore payment of the same
character (tangible property lease) as the lease payments.2 7 The court
rejected the taxpayer's second argument with the more tenuous rationale
that the original lease provided for amendments and this transaction was
properly executed as an amendment under the lease, thus making the
payment taxable as part of the lease.28 The court held that the applica-
tion of comptroller rule 3.294(d)(5), which specifically states that lease
termination payments are taxable as part of the lease price, was reasona-
ble under these circumstances. 29 Assuming the decision is factually cor-
rect, the possibility that the rationale could be unfairly stretched to
extend to other types of contracts, such as service contracts, is troubling.30
The taxpayer in Turnkey Construction, Inc. v. Sharp31 prevailed on its
claim that the installation of new vapor recovery systems for service sta-
tions is considered nontaxable new construction. The comptroller had
argued that the installation of these new systems constituted taxable real
property repair and remodeling.32 The taxpayer, however, countered
that the new systems were designed to perform functions that the old
system could not, that the piping for the new systems was located in new
trenches, and that the taxpayer did not connect these new systems to the
existing fuel pumps. Thus, the installation of these systems should be
treated as new construction. In reviewing the comptroller's rules, the tax-
payer noted that the installations of the vapor recovery systems did not
meet the definition of repair, restoration, remodeling, or modification,
25. Id.
26. 988 S.W.2d 467 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).
27. See id. at 470 (relying in part on 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.294(d) (1999)).
28. See id. at 471.
29. See id. at 470; see also 34 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 3.294(d)(5) (1999).
30. The court placed great weight on the comptroller's administrative rules; however,
it also relied on TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.007 (Vernon Supp. 2000). Fortunately for
taxpayers, a case released after the survey period confirmed that section 151.007 does not
have an unlimited reach. See Rylander v. San Antonio SMSA L.P., 11 S.W.3d 484 (Tex.
App.-Austin Jan. 6, 2000, no pet.) (engineering services not "part of the sale" of tangible
personal property and therefore not taxable).
31. No. 98-12767 (98th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. July 21, 1999).
32. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0047 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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but did satisfy the definition of new construction. 33 By ruling in favor of
the taxpayer, the district court rejected the conclusion in the comptrol-
ler's hearing that the installation was merely an upgrade or modification
to existing real property. 34
In an administrative hearing to determine if leases should be classified
as either real or personal property leases, the tax division failed to con-
vince the administrative law judge that classification should be deter-
mined solely from the lease contract language. The judge in Comptroller
Decision 36,17735 instead held that the established precedent requires the
court look at three factors to determine if property should be classified as
real property, including: (1) whether the item has actually or construc-
tively been annexed to real property; (2) whether the item has been fitted
or adapted for the specific use or purpose of the realty; and (3) the party's
intent to make the annexation to the real property permanent. 36 While
the court agreed that the party's intent is the most important factor in
making this determination, it refused to look solely to the lease contract
language, or the intent of the party, to make this determination. 37 The
administrative law judge noted in his opinion that both the Texas Attor-
ney General and the comptroller's office had previously used the three-
pronged Hutchins test to determine whether property is classified as real
or personal, and that the comptroller had informed the taxpayer in this
case during a prior audit that this is the proper test to be used.38
Decision 36,775 is one that all ticket-issuing vendors should note.39 In
this case, the theater operator/taxpayer occasionally allowed non-profit
organizations with valid exemption certificates to use the theater. The
non-profit organization would establish the ticket prices and receive all
the net proceeds from the ticket sales. The taxpayer issued the tickets for
these events using its equipment, which is standard in the industry. All
tickets issued by the taxpayer stated "price and taxes incl.," and the tax-
payer's equipment was not capable of issuing different tickets for exempt
and non-exempt events. The taxpayer argued that it did not intend to
charge sales tax on the tickets even though the face of the ticket stated
that such taxes were included in the ticket price.40 The administrative law
judge summarily ruled, citing section 111.016 of the Tax Code, that be-
cause the customers purchased a ticket stating that tax was included, the
taxpayer is liable for the amount represented to be tax.41 The decision
33. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.357(a)(5), (8), (9), (11) (1999).
34. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,044 (July 29, 1998). The distinction
between nontaxable new construction and taxable real property repair and remodeling
continues to be an elusive one, as both taxpayers and comptroller staff work (unsuccess-
fully?) to establish meaningful distinctions.
35. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,177 (Oct. 30, 1998).
36. See id. (citing Hutchins v. Masterson, 46 Tex. 551 (1877)).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,775 (Oct. 20, 1998).
40. See id.
41. See id. (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.016(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000)); see also 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.3 (1999).
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did not consider the fact that the taxpayer's equipment was not capable
of issuing substitute tickets to exclude the sales tax language.
In Decision 37,133, the taxpayer challenged the sales tax exemption
claimed under the agricultural exemption. 42 In this case, the taxpayer
operated a retail tire store that sold tires primarily to agricultural custom-
ers. During the audit period, the taxpayer did not collect sales tax on
tires mounted on vehicles with agricultural motor vehicle tags or on tires
sold and carried out of the store by customers with a blanket sales tax
exemption certificate on file with the taxpayer. Although the uses of such
tires may have been tax exempt, the taxpayer did not know and did not
inquire about the use by the customer of these tires before making the
tax-free sales. In upholding the audit assessment on the mounted tires,
the administrative law judge pointed to the fact that the Tax Code section
and the rule providing for exempt agricultural sales43 have additional re-
quirements that the Transportation Code 44 does not contain.45 Thus,
these differences prohibit the taxpayer from relying merely on the fact
that a vehicle has an agricultural tag in reaching its conclusion that the
sale of tires for such vehicles is tax exempt. 46 Only tires that are tractor
tires, tires for vehicles not licensed for highway use, and tires designated
by the manufacturer to be used only for farm or off-highway use qualify
for the sales tax exemption. 47 The administrative law judge rejected the
taxpayer's argument that tires qualify for the exemption for equipment
used exclusively to maintain exempt equipment since tires are specifically
included in the definition of replacement parts.48 As for the tax-free sales
made to customers for which the taxpayer had blanket sales tax exemp-
tion certificates, the judge held that the taxpayer could not rely on the
blanket sales tax exemption for sales of tires that may not have qualified
for that exemption.49 For such sales, the taxpayer must either receive a
separate exemption certificate or stamp the receipt with the words "ex-
empt agricultural purposes" and require the customer to sign the re-
ceipt.50 The judge also rejected the taxpayer's claim that repairs to tires
and equipment of forklifts, front-end loaders, backhoes, and other like
equipment was a tax exempt repair of a motor vehicle. 51
In Decision 36,707, which introduced a "novel twist" that had never
been fully addressed in a decision before, the administrative law judge
denied a tax exemption for the taxpayer's gas and electricity use.5 2 The
42. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,133 (Oct. 20, 1998).
43. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.316 (Vernon Supp. 2000); 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.296 (1999).
44. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §§ 502.163, 502.276 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2000).
45. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,133 (Oct. 20, 1998).
46. See id.
47. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.296(g)(4) (1999).
48. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,133; see also 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.296(g)(4), (5) (1999).
49. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.296(d) (1999).
50. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,133.
51. See id.; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0101(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
52. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,707 (Aug. 20, 1999).
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taxpayer in this case, a limited partnership, owned both a food processing
division and a restaurant division. The taxpayer requested a refund of
sales tax paid on its gas and electricity usage in its food processing divi-
sion, claiming that the gas and electricity were not used for preparing or
storing food for immediate consumption since the food was sent to the
restaurant division for preparation or storage for immediate consump-
tion. 53 The judge's decision characterized the transaction as preparation
of food at a separate facility for immediate consumption in a restaurant
owned by the same taxpayer. Under these facts, the judge found the con-
clusion "quite clear" and held that under the plain language of the stat-
ute, the taxpayer in this case was using the gas and electricity to prepare
or store food for immediate consumption and was therefore not entitled
to the sales tax exemption. 54 The fact that this use occurred in two differ-
ent locations and was billed to different meters was held to be irrelevant
because the same taxpayer operated both the food processing division
and the restaurants that prepared or served the food for immediate con-
sumption. 55 Although interesting for its own facts, the decision is also
interesting because of the judge's willingness to collapse the two
locations.
B. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The budget surplus, Internet issues, and social policy combined to trig-
ger several significant changes in the sales tax laws during the regular
session of the 76th Legislature. The Legislature modified the tax treat-
ment of Internet access services by adding several new provisions. Two
new definitional sections were added to define the terms "Internet" and
"Internet access service."'56 Internet access service is defined as a "ser-
vice that enables users to access content, information, electronic mail, or
other services offered over the Internet and may also include access to
proprietary content, information, and other services as part of a package
of services offered to consumers. ' 57 The term specifically does not in-
clude telecommunications services, 58 and the definition of telecommuni-
cations services was amended to specifically exclude Internet access
services from its definition as well.59
Additionally, the definitions of data processing services and informa-
tion services as of October 1, 1999, no longer include Internet access ser-
vices. 60 Although Internet access services are now explicitly included on
53. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.317(c)(2)(A)(i) (Vernon 1992).
54. See Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,707.
55. See id.
56. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.00393, 151.00394 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
57. Id. § 151.00394(a).
58. See id. The exclusion for telecommunications services was added to ensure that
telecommunications providers could not escape taxation by asserting that their services
"enable users to access" the Internet.
59. See id. § 151.0103(3).
60. See id. § 151.00394(c).
1304 [Vol. 53
TAXATION
the list of taxable services in Texas,61 the Legislature provided, effective
October 1, 1999, a tax exemption for the first $25 of the taxpayer's
monthly service charge. 62 This exemption applies regardless of the billing
period used or the other services that may be bundled with the Internet
access service. 63 A significant limitation on this exemption is that the ex-
emption amount is applied to the total amount billed to the taxpayer,
regardless of whether the charge is a lump-sum charge for multiple users
or separately stated for each user.64
Because Texas is one of only a handful of states that tax data process-
ing and information services, the Legislature considered repealing the tax
on these services during its 1999 session. Although budget concerns pre-
cluded a full repeal, the Legislature passed a new exemption for twenty
percent of the value of data processing and information services. 65 This
new exemption became effective on October 1, 1999.66
The Legislature enacted additional exemptions for health care supplies.
Effective April 1, 2000, the list of tax exempt items includes nonprescrip-
tion drugs or medicines labeled with a national drug code issued by the
Food and Drug Administration and blood glucose monitoring test
strips.67 An additional exemption for adjustable eating utensils pur-
chased and used to facilitate independent eating by a person without full
use or control of his or her hands or arms was also added, to be effective
July 1, 1999.68
In what was likely the most publicized tax relief, the Legislature added
a new section to provide what is popularly termed a "sales tax holiday"
for a three-day period in August.69 Articles of clothing and footwear with
a total sales price of less than $100 are exempt from tax under this new
provision.70 Excluded from this exemption are special clothing or foot-
wear primarily designed for athletic activity or protective use that is not
61. See id. § 151.0101(a)(16).
62. See id. § 151.325(a).
63. See id. § 151.325(b).
64. See id. § 151.325(c).
65. See id. § 151.351.
66. A draft amendment to 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.330 would have limited the ex-
emption to services provided under contracts entered into after October 1, 1999. However,
recognizing that the numerous "grandfather clauses," enacted by the Legislature to protect
existing contracts from increased tax rates, would have been superfluous if a law failed to
reach pre-existing contracts, comptroller representatives indicated orally that the draft
would be revised to make it clear that services would be exempt on and after October 1,
without regard to the date of any underlying contract. For an example of a grandfather
provision, see 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.319 (1999).
67. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 151.313(a)(3), (12) (Vernon Supp. 2000). The comp-
troller's staff was working with the industry to find possible solutions to the apparent ineq-
uity created by the fact that some drug companies use the FDA Drug Code, but others do
not.
68. See id. § 151.313(a)(11) (note that the Legislature gave this amendment a duplicate
section number).
69. See id. § 151.326(a). Like many of the other tax relief provisions, this holiday rep-





normally worn for other purposes, accessories including jewelry, and any
rental clothing or footwear.7' The statute authorizes local taxing authori-
ties to repeal the exemption, as it applies to local taxes, on or after Janu-
ary 1, 2000.72 Any services performed on tangible personal property sold
under this exemption remain taxable.73
The Legislature added a new chapter to the Texas Tax Code to give
local taxing authorities the authority to repeal a state sales tax exemption
for the purposes of local sales tax.74 Only a sales tax exemption that spe-
cifically provides that it may be repealed by the governing body of a local
taxing authority may be repealed. 75 To repeal an exemption, the gov-
erning body of the taxing authority must hold a public hearing and then
adopt an appropriate order to repeal the exemption by a majority vote,
which must be recorded in the minutes of the governing body's meeting. 76
A copy of the order adopted by the governing body must be sent by certi-
fied or registered mail to the comptroller. 77 A state sales tax exemption
that has been properly repealed under this procedure may also be rein-
stated in this same manner. 78 A repeal or reinstatement of state sales tax
under these provisions, which are effective as of October 1, 1999, will be
effective the first day of the first calendar quarter after the comptroller
receives a copy of the order from the governing body of the taxing
authority. 79
The 1999 Legislature rewrote much of the section that provides an ex-
emption for gas and electricity. 80 As rewritten, the law provides that the
sale of gas and electricity will be exempt only when sold for specified
uses. 81 A sale will be considered exempt if it is sold to a person using the
gas or electricity in an exempt manner or used by an independent con-
tractor who is engaged by the purchaser to perform such exempt activi-
ties.82 If natural gas or electricity from a single meter is used during a
normal billing period for both exempt and taxable purposes, the sale will
be considered either totally taxable or totally exempt based on the pre-
dominant use of the natural gas or electricity measured by the meter.83
71. See id. § 151.326(b). Testimony during the legislative hearings made it clear that it
would be necessary to specify that shoes may not be sold separately (rather than as a pair)
to fall below the $100 limit.
72. See id. § 151.326(c). This provision addresses the local jurisdictions, several of
which feared the fiscal impact of reduced sales tax revenue. Note, however, that localities
may repeal only certain specified exemptions. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
73. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3111(b)(6) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
74. See id. §§ 326.001- .004.
75. See id. § 326.002.
76. See id. §§ 326.003(a), (b), (d).
77. See id. § 326.003(d).
78. See id. § 326.003(c).
79. See id. § 326.004. This increasing local autonomy, which addresses certain con-
cerns of the local jurisdictions, is at cross purposes with the goal of simplifying tax compli-
ance and illustrates again the difficulty of moving toward a uniform local tax base.
80. See id. § 151.317.
81. See id. § 151.317(a).
82. See id. § 151.317(d).
83. See id. § 151.317(e).
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The manufacturing exemption is another provision that the 76th Legis-
lature substantially changed. 84 The revisions to the manufacturing ex-
emption reflect a "re-do" of the 1997 legislative changes to that provision.
Despite multiple conferences among legislators, comptroller staff, and in-
dustry, the 1999 changes produced widespread confusion, particularly be-
cause taxpayers believed the comptroller was construing the revised
exemption too narrowly.85 In 1999, industry and comptroller representa-
tives again worked to redraft and clarify the exemption. The list of prop-
erty "sold, leased, or rented to, or stored, used, or consumed by a
manufacturer"8 6 that is considered exempt from tax was significantly ex-
panded to include: additional devices used at an electric generating facil-
ity,87 an expansion of property eligible for the exemption as necessary
and essential to a pollution control process, 88 lubricants and chemicals
used to prevent deterioration of exempt equipment,89 gases used at a
manufacturing plant to prevent contamination of raw materials or prod-
ucts or to prevent hazardous situations in the manufacturing process,90
tangible personal property necessary to the quality control process,91 cer-
tain safety apparel, 92 tangible personal property used in the actual manu-
facturing, processing, or fabrication if the use is necessary to comply with
public health laws,93 and tangible personal property that is specifically
installed to conserve water in the manufacturing process.94 Additional
exemptions include conveyor systems for piping that is a component part
of a single item of exempt manufacturing or pollution control equipment,
certain piping between a single item of manufacturing equipment and an-
cillary equipment that operate together to perform a specific step in the
manufacturing process, and piping through which the product or an inter-
mediate product that will become a component part of the product is
recycled back to another single item of manufacturing equipment and its
ancillary equipment. 95 For purposes of this exemption for piping, an inte-
grated group of machines is not treated as a single item of manufacturing
equipment, and piping through which material is transported between
single items of manufacturing equipment is not considered a component
part of a single item of manufacturing equipment, and is therefore not
exempt.96 Additional exemptions are now provided for certain specifi-
84. See id. § 151.318.
85. See Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 51 SMU L. REV. 1345, 1354-55 (1998)
for a summary of the 1997 changes.
86. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
87. See id. § 151.318(a)(4).
88. See id. § 151.318(a)(5).
89. See id. § 151.318(a)(6).
90. See id. § 151.318(a)(7).
91. See id. § 151.318(a)(8).
92. See id. § 151.318(a)(9).
93. See id. § 151.318(a)(10).
94. See id. § 151.318(a)(11).
95. See id. § 151.318(c)(1).
96. See id. § 151.318(f)
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cally listed items used in a printing process. 97 To qualify for this exemp-
tion, these items must be purchased by a person engaged in either
printing or imprinting tangible personal property for sale, or producing a
free newspaper that is distributed to the general public. 98 Additions to
the list of items excluded from the manufacturing exemption are mainte-
nance supplies and equipment, 99 janitorial supplies and equipment,100
and tangible personal property used in transmitting or distributing
electricity.' 0 '
Although the comptroller had previously confirmed that the section
151.318(p)102 exemption, a subsection of the manufacturing exemption,
applies to broadcasters, industry and comptroller representatives worked
together to recommend legislative changes to clarify this exemption. Ac-
cordingly, the legislature added new section 151.3185 to include the ex-
emptions for these industries. 0 3 This new provision separates the
broadcast/motion picture exemption from the general manufacturing ex-
emption. It exempts the sale, lease, rental, storage, use, or other con-
sumption of tangible personal property that will become an ingredient or
component part of or is necessary or essential to producing a motion pic-
ture or video or audio recording that is either sold, licensed, distributed,
exhibited, or broadcast to the general public or to cable television sub-
scribers.104 This exemption also applies to services that are necessary and
essential to and used directly in such productions, unless the services are
specifically excluded under the new statute. 10 5 Some specific examples of
exempt items are cameras, film, lights, teleprompters, and similarly neces-
sary items.10 6 Items specifically listed as not eligible for the exemption
include office equipment or supplies, transportation equipment, or taxa-
ble items used only incidentally in the production. 10 7
Section 151.354, another new section added to the Texas Tax Code, ex-
empts services performed by certain employees of property management
companies. 10 8 The employee must be permanently assigned by the com-
pany to one rental property and remain assigned to that property while
employed by successive owners or companies.' 0 9 The property manage-
ment company also must be reimbursed on a dollar-for-dollar basis for
the services provided.110 Further, the property management company
must be contractually obligated to the property owner to exercise control
97. See id. § 151.318(t).
98. See id. § 151.318(t).
99. See id. § 151.318(c)(3).
100. See id.
101. See id. § 151.318(c)(5).
102. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.31 8(p) (Vernon Supp. 1999) (repealed 1999).
103. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.3185 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
104. See id. § 151.3185(a).
105. See id. §§ 151.3185(a)(3), (c).
106. See id. § 151.3185(b).
107. See id. § 151.3185(c).
108. See id. § 151.354.
109. See id.
110. See id. § 151.354(a).
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over the activities of the employee providing the service and also must
manage and direct the employee's day-to-day activities. 1 ' A person will
be considered an employee of a property management company if he is
an employee of the property management company or an affiliate.1 12
The property management company or its affiliate, however, must con-
tinue to pay tax on the taxable items purchased and provided to employ-
ees performing services on the managed property.1 13
The provision entitling a retailer to a credit or refund for taxes paid on
the portion of an account determined to be worthless or an item that has
been repossessed now includes any person who extends credit to a pur-
chaser under a retailer's private label credit agreement, or an assignee or
affiliate of such a person or retailer. 114 To be entitled to a credit or reim-
bursement, the person must meet the specific requirements listed in the
statute, which generally include that the retailer maintains a valid sales or
use tax permit and remits the tax for which the credit or reimbursement is
sought, all payments on the account are prorated between taxable and
nontaxable charges, and the retailer or other person provides detailed
records.1 5 The detailed records must contain the information specifically
listed in the statute, unless persons whose volume and character of uncol-
lectible accounts warrant an alternate method and the comptroller ap-
proves such method.116 Comptroller approval, however, is subject to
being revoked due to a substantive or interpretive change in the law or a
change in the taxpayer's operations.1 1 7
The provision that allows for the tax-free sale of certain taxable items
at a one-day sale of a religious, educational, or public service organization
was amended to allow for the tax-free sale of any item at such an event,
as long as the item was manufactured by or donated to the organization
and is sold to any purchaser other than the donor."18 The description of
requirements for a nonprofit hospital or hospital system to be exempt
from sales tax was reduced extensively and currently requires the provi-
sion of community benefits that include charity care and government-
sponsored indigent health care as provided in the Texas Health and
Safety Code. 119
Another new code section added in 1999 relates to the taxpayer's abil-
ity to participate in a managed sales tax audit.120 These managed audits,
which take place by written agreement between the comptroller and the
111. See id. § 151.354(d).
112. See id. § 151.354(c).
113. See id. § 151.354(e).
114. See id. § 151.426(c).
115. See id. § 151.426(e).
116. See id. § 151.426(f).
117. See id. § 151.426(g).
118. See id. § 151.310(c).
119. See id. § 151.310(e); see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 311.041-.048
(Vernon Supp. 2000).
120. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0231(Vernon Supp. 2000).
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taxpayer, may be limited to certain categories of tax liability.121 Such
categories may include: sales of certain types of taxable items, purchases
of assets or expense items, purchases under a direct payment permit, or
another category specified in the comptroller's agreement with the tax-
payer. 122 The comptroller, who has the sole right to determine whether
to authorize a managed audit, may consider the taxpayer's history of tax
compliance, the taxpayer's time and resources available to commit to the
audit, the amount and availability of the taxpayer's records, the tax-
payer's ability to pay any expected liability, and any other factors consid-
ered relevant by the comptroller. 2 3
Taxpayers that hold direct payment permits may also choose an op-
tional percentage-based method to report taxable transactions. 124 If the
comptroller authorizes this method, it must be used for three years unless
otherwise revoked by the comptroller. 125 The comptroller may revoke
the authorization if the percentage used to calculate the tax is no longer
representative due to a change in the law's substance or interpretation or
a change in the taxpayer's operations, and the comptroller's decision re-
garding this is not appealable. 26
Also effective October 1, 1999, a taxpayer may calculate overpaid sales
and use taxes by using a projection based on a sampling of transactions
and methods approved by the comptroller. 12 7 The methods used by the
taxpayer and the supporting records must be recorded and made availa-
ble to the comptroller upon request. 28 An overpayment of taxes paid by
a person holding a permit, including an erroneous tax payment to a re-
tailer, can be recovered by the taxpayer either as a credit on future sales
tax returns or by filing a refund claim with the comptroller. 29
The Legislature placed additional limitations on the ability of purchas-
ers who pay sales tax on property to be exported to receive a refund of
such taxes.1 30 The retailer must now wait until either twenty-four hours
after the time of export as shown on the export documentation if the
retailer is located in a county bordering Mexico, or seven days after the
day of export as shown on the export documentation for all other retail-
121. See id. §§ 151.0231(b), (c). The comptroller had already entered into several such
agreements by the end of 1999.
122. See id. § 151.0231(b).
123. See id. §§ 151.0231(d), (e).
124. See id. § 151.4171.
125. See id. § 151.4171(b).
126. See id. §§ 151.4171(c), (d).
127. See id. § 151.430(b). This legislation is a follow-up to the settlement of an earlier
litigation case. See Cynthia M. Ohlenforst & Jeff W. Dorrill, Taxation, 52 SMU L. REV.
1453, 1459 (1999).
128. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.430(d) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
129. See id. §§ 151.430(a), (c). The comptroller has pointed out that this provision al-
lows taxpayers, on a prospective basis, the relief sought in Fleming Foods (see supra note
10). Note, however, that the provision provides such relief only to taxpayers with a Texas
tax permit.
130. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.307(d) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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ers.131 Any retailer that prematurely makes a refund, or that makes an
undocumented or improperly documented refund, is held liable for the
refund amount with interest.' 32
The Legislature also added several other miscellaneous and technical
amendments to the Tax Code during the recent session. In connection
with the exemption for amusement services, the Legislature added a defi-
nition for educational organizations to include an entity described by sec-
tion 61.003(8) or (15) of the Texas Education Code.133 The exemption for
periodicals and writings of religious, philanthropic, charitable, historical,
scientific, and similar organizations now extends to periodicals and writ-
ings that are presented on audiotape, videotape, and computer disk. 134
However, such periodicals and writings must now be both published and
distributed. 135 The dollar limit on the amount of tangible personal prop-
erty sold through coin-operated bulk vending machines that is treated as
exempt has been increased from twenty-five cents to fifty cents. 136 The
exemption for university and college student organizations was amended
to exempt all sales of taxable items manufactured by or donated to the
organization, regardless of sales price, unless sold to the donor.137 An-
other new exemption provided by the 1999 Legislature makes the sale of
an animal by nonprofit animal shelters exempt from sales tax.138 The def-
inition of "restore," for purposes of the exemption for labor to restore
certain property, was amended to include a service to repair, restore or
apply a protective chemical to an item. 139 The Legislature also added to
the list information that can be released from a taxpayer's records. 140 Ef-
fective September 1, 1999, information in or derived from a governmental
body's record, report, or other required instrument may be released. 141
Additionally, several sections were amended to change references to De-
partment of Commerce to the Department of Economic Development. 142
C. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
In an effort to help clarify the much publicized sales tax holiday under
section 151.326, the comptroller issued regulatory guidance before the
131. See id.
132. See id. § 151.307(e).
133. See id. § 151.3101(c); see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 61.003(8), (15) (Vernon Supp.
2000).
134. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.312 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
135. See id. Like many other legislative provisions, this provision addresses contested
issues; the comptroller had previously asserted that the "published or distributed" lan-
guage was equivalent to the newly-enacted "published and distributed" standard.
136. See id. § 151.305(a).
137. See id. § 151.321(a).
138. See id. § 151.343.
139. See id. § 151.350(d)(1).
140. See id. § 151.027(c)(7).
141. See id.
142. See id. §§ 151.429, 151.4921, 151.431.
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first holiday in August of 1999.143 The new rule, which became effective
on July 5, 1999, and expired on November 2, 1999, addressed many of the
issues that arose during the legislative hearings process. 14 4 A new rule,
entitled the "Taxpayer's Bill of Rights," was also adopted during the sur-
vey period. 145 This new rule provides, among other things, that the
comptroller's office will provide responses to telephone calls and written
requests within certain set periods of time, that comptroller rules and reg-
ulations will be readily available and easy to understand, that a fair and
timely complaint system will be implemented, that interest will be paid on
refunds beginning in January 2000, and that the comptroller will continue
to foster a close working relationship with the business community. 146
II. FRANCHISE TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAX
What the district court giveth, the appellate court taketh away-that's
the message facing taxpayers in Rylander v. 3 Beall Bros. 3, Inc.147 and in
Rylander v. B&A Marketing.148
Both cases focus on the validity of the "additional tax" imposed by
section 171.001.149 When Beall Brothers ceased doing business in Texas
on August 2, 1993, the "additional tax" it owed was based on eighteen
months. However, corporate taxpayers with a calendar year-end that dis-
solved on the same date paid "additional tax" based on only seven
months. The taxpayer therefore argued that section 171.001 imposed un-
equal tax burdens on similarly situated taxpayers. B&A Marketing, on
the other hand, focused its challenge to the statute on statutory interpre-
tation - arguing that because B&A was not subject to the taxable capital
tax for the year at issue, it could not be liable under the literal statutory
language for the additional tax. The district court decisions in these two
cases held in favor of the taxpayers.1 50
However, the comptroller appealed-and won-both cases. The B&A
Marketing court noted that section 171.001 includes two requirements:
that a corporation "is subject to the tax imposed under section 171.001,"
and that the corporation "is no longer subject to the taxing jurisdiction of
143. See 24 Tex. Reg. 5277 (1999) (emerg. rule 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.365) (adopted
July 16, 1999, expired Nov. 2, 1999) (Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts).
144. See id. (including the single shoe issue; see supra note 71 and accompanying text).
To the comptroller's credit, comptroller staff remained available by telephone throughout
the weekend to answer questions arising in connection with the sales tax holiday.
145. See 24 Tex. Reg. 4539, adopted 24 Tex. Reg. 6805 (1999) (codified at 34 TEX. AD-
MIN. CODE § 3.10).
146. See id. Some of these changes, e.g., with respect to interest payments, are based on
1999 !egislative provisions.
147. 2 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet. h.).
148. 997 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. filed).
149. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 2000).
150. See No. 97-05710 (261st Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. June 25, 1998); No. 97-01522
(250th Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Sept. 1998).
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this state in relation to the tax on net taxable earned surplus. ' '151 The
taxpayer had argued (rather reasonably) that these two requirements ef-
fectively impose tax only on corporations that remain subject to the
franchise tax, but not subject to the earned surplus. As a practical matter,
as the court feared, B&A's interpretation of the statute would limit the
statute's application to corporations that are doing business in Texas but
are protected from the income tax component of the tax (i.e., the earned
surplus component) by Public Law 86-272.152
B&A, by contrast, emphasized that the comptroller's reading of the
statute would enable Texas to impose tax on a corporation that is no
longer "doing business" in Texas, despite the fact that the doing-business
test has long been the standard for imposition of the tax.153 The comp-
troller responded that the statute requires that a taxpayer be doing busi-
ness only "at the time the event occurs that causes the entity to cease to
be subject to the tax,"154 not that the taxpayer continue to be doing busi-
ness in Texas. In accepting the comptroller's interpretation, the court
paid significant deference to the comptroller's construction of the tax; the
court also paid somewhat more attention to the statutory rule of con-
struction that taxing statutes should be liberally construed to raising reve-
nue than to the equally important rule that taxing statutes are to be
strictly construed against the taxing authority.1 55
The court further held that B&A failed to carry the burden of rebutting
the presumption of constitutionality, alternately holding that the statute
does not create double taxation, creates a rational basis for imposing an
income tax, and does not violate the Commerce Clause or discriminate
against interstate commerce.
It is noteworthy that the court appears to treat the "additional tax" as
different from the franchise tax,156 noting that "[a]lthough the tax is es-
sentially an income tax, it is not improper that the statute is included in
the Franchise Tax Act, because the additional tax will apply only to those
entities already subject to the franchise tax."1 57
In Rylander v. 3 Beall Bros. 3, Inc.,158 issued the month after B&A
Marketing, the court again found the additional tax statute constitutional.
Although the court's reasoning and the cases upon which it relies vary
from the B&A Marketing decision, the court ultimately concluded that
the tax is constitutional, observing that "[b]ecause the tax was tied to
earnings, it was in proper proportion to Bealls' activities in Texas and
therefore to the consequent enjoyment of the opportunities and protec-
151. B & A Mktg., 997 S.W.2d at 331 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001).
152. Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (1959).
153. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1032. (Vernon Supp. 2000)
154. B & A Mktg., 997 S.W.2d at 332.
155. The court cites both rules of construction. See id. at 330-31.
156. After all, the franchise tax would not extend to corporations that are no longer
doing business in Texas.
157. B & A Mktg., 997 S.W.2d at 326.
158. 2 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, no pet. h.).
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tion which the state has afforded. 1 59
Nabisco, Inc. v. Rylander focused on the apportionment of gross re-
ceipts for franchise tax purposes.160 Nabisco, Inc. and Planters/Lifesavers
Company brought suit for franchise tax refunds, arguing that sales of
food manufactured outside Texas, shipped to Texas for storage, and then
sold to Texas buyers should be treated as sales from the out-of-state facil-
ities to the Texas buyers, rather than (as the comptroller argued) sales
from inside the state. The distinction is crucial because section 171.104161
allows a taxpayer to deduct from its Texas receipts certain food exempted
from sales tax "if the items are shipped from outside the state." 162 The
comptroller agreed that, but for the out-of-state shipping requirement,
the food receipts at issue could be deducted from Texas receipts. Nabisco
and Planters contended that the sale and shipment from out of state need
not be simultaneous, while the comptroller asserted that they must.163
After a thorough analysis that looked back to the 1969 version of the
statute, 164 the court found that the comptroller's rule that sale and ship-
ment of the food occur simultaneously represents "a reasonable and long-
standing interpretation of section 171.004 that does not contradict the
plain language of the statute."'1 65
Several decisions issued during the Annual Survey period reflect the
continuing difficulty of consistently interpreting the franchise tax as it in-
volves partnerships.
Decision 36,495166 illustrates this confusion. The corporate taxpayer in
this case held a fifty percent interest in a joint venture treated as a gen-
eral partnership. The joint venture was engaged in the refining petro-
leum products. The taxpayer had taken credits on its 1994 and 1995
franchise tax reports for property purchased by the joint venture as refin-
ery. Before that time, the taxpayer had secured a ruling from the comp-
troller confirming that corporate partners of a partnership doing business
in an enterprise zone as a qualified business "may take a deduction
against taxable capital subject to the requirements of 171.1015 of the Tax
Code,"'1 67 and noting that the deduction for the corporate partner would
be limited to fifty percent of its prorata capital investment in the partner-
ship. As the findings of fact pointed out, the taxpayer in this case histori-
cally determined its receipts from the joint venture based on the gross
method for apportionment purposes, thereby disregarding the separate
159. Id. (citation omitted).
160. 992 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).
161. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.104 (Vernon 1992).
162. Id.
163. Note the contrast between the comptroller's position in this case and the comptrol-
ler's position in B&A Marketing that statutory requirements (i.e., being subject to
franchise tax but not subject to the earned surplus component of the tax, see supra note 154
and accompanying text) need not be met simultaneously.
164. See Nabisco, 992 S.W.2d at 683.
165. Id. at 684.
166. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,495 (Jan. 19, 1999).
167. Id.
1314 [Vol. 53
existence of the partnership. 168 The tax division disagreed with the ruling
letter, and argued that section 171.0021, at issue in the administrative
hearing, is distinguishable from section 171.1015, referred to in the letter
ruling. The comptroller relied on the statutory language of section
171.0021(d), which provides explicitly that a corporation "may not con-
vey, assign or transfer the credit allowed under this section to another
entity. ' 169 The administrative law judge ultimately concluded that the
taxpayer was not a manufacturer and that the sales tax paid by the joint
venture should not pass through to the taxpayer. As to the prior ruling
the taxpayer had received, the administrative law judge concluded that
the comptroller has interpreted section 171.0021 differently from section
171.1015, and that an exemption could be strictly construed.
170
Decision 37,454171 also focused on whether a corporate partner was
entitled to take a credit attributable to sales tax on manufacturing equip-
ment for equipment purchased by the joint venture in which it held an
interest. This taxpayer also lost, as the judge followed the precedent es-
tablished in Hearing 36,495.172 In essence, these decisions accept the
comptroller's interpretation that partnerships are separate legal entities
whose tax attributes do not flow through to the corporate partners. 173
Another partnership decision rendered during the survey period, Deci-
sion 36,497,174 addresses the issue of whether and how a corporate part-
ner reports receipts from a controlled partnership for franchise tax
purposes, particularly in the taxable capital context. In this case, the
comptroller aggregated all the gross receipts of several downstream part-
nerships (including receipts from sales between the partnerships), effec-
tively requiring the corporate partner to report more gross receipts than
the entities had under the GAAP standards that the applicable statute'
75
refers to. Thus, the comptroller's holding would require a corporation
that chooses the gross receipts method of reporting its receipts to include
the receipts not only from its first tier partnership, but also receipts be-
tween that partnership and a lower tier partnership as well as the receipts
from the lower tier partnership's sales to third parties. The effect of forc-
ing the corporate investor to report the gross receipts of each of these
partnerships is effectively to triple report receipts, as the receipts move
upstream from the third-party customer, through a mid-tier partnership,
to the top partnership. This case presents a particularly interesting juxta-
168. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 3.549(e)(29)(B) (1999).
169. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0021(d) (Vernon 1992).
170. Penalty was waived.
171. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,454 (Aug. 11, 1999).
172. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
173. See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,795 (Mar. 15, 1999). This deci-
sion is yet another case in which the taxpayer claimed that, as a corporate partner of a
Texas general partnership, it was entitled to claim its pro rata share of sales tax paid by the
partnership on certain manufacturing materials.
174. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,497 (June 29, 1999).
175. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.112 (Vernon Supp. 2000) (specifically allowing a cor-
porate partner to report the gross receipts of a partnership, but only to the extent the
receipts are revenue for generally accepted accounting purposes).
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position to the three cases previously discussed, each of which focused on
the comptroller's view that a partnership is a separate legal entity whose
tax characteristics do not "flow through" to the corporate partner. 176
The case is also noteworthy because it reflects the comptroller's posi-
tion that the prohibition in section 171.112(d) on consolidated reporting
effectively means that a partnership may not consolidate its receipts with
those of related partnerships or corporations. However, as the taxpayer
pointed out, if the prohibition on consolidation truly prohibited a corpo-
ration and a partnership from consolidating their receipts, there would
appear to be no basis for requiring the corporate partner to report the
partnership's gross receipts as its own. 177
Decision 37,294178 illustrates a different result for trusts and partner-
ships on similar facts. This case focused on the sourcing of receipts from
grantor trusts. Taxpayers had argued that these were look-through enti-
ties and that the taxpayer's corporate receipts should therefore be
sourced based on the actual investments of the trusts. Because the invest-
ments (including interest, dividends, and gains from sales of marketable
securities) were intangibles, the taxpayer hoped to rely on the location of
payor test. The comptroller argued, on the other hand, that the trusts
were Texas trusts so the receipts should be sourced to Texas. The admin-
istrative law judge concluded that "[tihe bottom line here is that there is
no rule provision comparable to the partnership rule for treatment of re-
ceipts from trusts."'179
Further finding that there was nothing in the statute that required the
comptroller to treat partnerships as flow-through entities,180 the judge
concluded that the taxpayer's position must be rejected "regardless of
any philosophical merit. '18' The result of this case is that partnerships
and trusts, while treated similarly for federal income tax and other pur-
poses, including certain franchise tax purposes, are treated differently for
gross receipts purposes in the earned surplus context. This decision is one
of several that illustrates the difficulty the comptroller has in finding a
consistent approach to partnership and trust cases, and appears to under-
176. The actual facts of Decision 36,497 involved a corporate partner that owned a con-
trolling interest in a first tier partnership that sold gas and crude oil to second tier partner-
ships. The second tier partnerships then marketed and resold the gas and crude oil to third
parties.
177. The administrative law judge's conclusion that the "no consolidation rule" prohib-
its a partner from consolidating receipts with related partnerships or corporate partner
appears inconsistent not only with the statutory requirement that a corporate partner re-
port the partner's receipts, but also with the language of several earlier decisions. See
generally Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 34,567 (Feb. 2, 1998); Hearing No. 33,972
(Aug. 15, 1996); and Hearing No. 33,258 (May 19, 1995).
178. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,294 (Mar. 19, 1999).
179. Id.
180. Does this case mean that the relevant rule, 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.557(e)(24),
is not required by the statute? This case also points to the difficulty in finding consistent
interpretations in the partnership context.
181. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,294.
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score inconsistency in the comptroller's position with respect to these
entities.
B. REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS
Although the comptroller issued numerous rules in draft or proposed
form shortly after the survey period (most in response to legislative
changes), the comptroller did not adopt any significant franchise tax rules
during the survey period.
C. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Legislators struggled mightily during the 1999 session to provide tax
relief to individuals and to businesses. The result is a mix of franchise tax
credits that address both. The 1999 Legislature amended section
171.002182 to provide that, effective January 1, 2000, a corporation is not
required to pay any franchise tax if: (1) the amount of tax computed for
the corporation is less than $100; or (2) the amount of gross receipts from
the corporation's entire business is less than $150,000. However, even
corporations exempt from franchise tax under this provision must con-
tinue to file a public information report.183 In addition, the comptroller
may require an officer of a corporation exempt from franchise tax under
this provision to file an abbreviated information report stating the
amount of the corporation's gross receipts from its entire business, al-
though the comptroller cannot require the corporation to report or com-
pute its earned surplus or taxable capital. This provision was drafted as
relief for small taxpayers, and that goal will likely be achieved. Although
the provision could provide the opportunity to avoid franchise taxes even
for corporations with a multi-million dollar taxable capital (but no re-
ceipts), 184 a sale or other receipts-triggering event by such a corporation,
absent careful tax planning for the event, could trigger substantial
franchise tax liability.'8 5
Another of the 1999 Legislature's several tax relief provisions appears
in new subchapter N of chapter 171 of the Tax Code. 186 This new sub-
chapter provides a credit for corporations that provide a day-care facility
or that purchase child-care services for children of their employees on or
after January 1, 2000. Qualifying expenditures by a corporation include
payments to plan, construct, renovate, or maintain a day-care center that
primarily provides care for children of employees of the corporation or of
182. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 171.002 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
183. See id. § 171.203(a).
184. For example, a company that holds a billion dollars of Texas real property, but has
no receipts, would owe no franchise tax.
185. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.204(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000). For this reason (among
others), partnerships and trusts will likely remain popular entities in Texas because those
entities are not subject to the tax. As legislators have recognized in the past, the availabil-
ity of nontaxable structures may result in some loss of tax revenue, but it also contributes
to significant business growth in Texas.
186. See id. §§ 171.701-.707.
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the corporation and one or more other entities that share the costs of
establishing and maintaining the day-care center. 187 Other qualifying ex-
penditures are purchases of child-care services that are actually provided
to children of employees of the corporation at a day-care center or family
home that is registered or listed with the Department of Protective and
Regulatory Services.188
A corporation must apply for the credit on a form to be prescribed by
the comptroller with its report for the period for which the credit is
claimed. 189 The credit is equal to the lesser of $50,000 or fifty percent of
the corporation's qualifying expenditures, but in no event may it exceed
ninety percent of the tax due for the reporting period. 190 There is no
carryover of unused credits, and assignment or any other transfer of the
credit is prohibited unless all of the assets of the corporation are trans-
ferred in the same transaction. 191 The comptroller will be required to file
a report detailing various information about use of the credit at the be-
ginning of each regular session of the Legislature. 192
Several new research and development credits are also available to tax-
payers. New subchapter 0 in chapter 171 of the Tax Code, for example,
reflects the Legislature's recognition of the interrelationship between re-
search and development credits and the growth of businesses in Texas. 193
This subchapter provides a credit for corporations that make qualified
research expenditures in Texas on or after January 1, 2000. This new ex-
emption was part of one of the most heavily debated tax relief proposals
of the 1999 session. Although draft legislation appeared in many differ-
ent forms, the enacted provision provides that "base amount," "basic re-
search payment," and "qualified research expense" have the same
meanings as in Internal Revenue Code section 41, except that all qualify-
ing expenses must be for research conducted within Texas. 194 The credit
is equal to five percent of the sum of excess qualified research expenses
over the base amount and basic research payments. 195 A corporation
may instead elect to compute its credit for qualified research expenses in
a manner consistent with the alternative incremental credit in Internal
Revenue Code section 41(c)(4). 196 In either case, if the qualified re-
search expenses are made in a strategic investment area, defined as a
county designated by the comptroller that has below state average per
capita income or is a federally designated urban enterprise community or
urban enhanced enterprise community, then the qualified research ex-
187. See id. §§ 171.703(a)(1), (b).
188. See id. § 171.703(a)(2).
189. See id. § 171.704.
190. See id. § 171.703(c).
191. See id. §§ 171.705-.706.
192. See id. § 171.707.
193. See id. §§ 171.721-.730.
194. See id. § 171.721(1).
195. See id. § 171.723(a).
196. See id. § 171.723(b).
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penses and basic research payments are doubled. 197
The total credit taken in any reporting period may not exceed fifty per-
cent of the amount of franchise tax due before any other applicable cred-
its, and the aggregate credits for research expenses, job creation activities,
and capital investments cannot exceed the amount of franchise tax due
for the reporting period after any other applicable credits. 198 Any unused
credit may be carried forward for up to twenty consecutive reporting pe-
riods. 199 The research and development credit will expire on Decem-
ber 31, 2009, but the expiration will not affect any unused carryforwards.
As with the child-care credit, the comptroller will be required to file a
report detailing various information about use of the credit at the begin-
ning of each regular session of the Legislature.200 A corporation eligible
for this credit will not be eligible for the job creation credit described
below.201 There are temporary reduced credit rates that apply for reports
originally due before January 1, 2002.
New subchapter P, added to chapter 171 of the Tax Code, provides a
credit for corporations in certain lines of business that create new jobs in
strategic investment areas on or after January 1, 2000.202 A corporation
will be eligible for the credit if:
(1) it is a qualified business, meaning a business primarily engaged in
"agricultural processing," "central administrative offices," "distri-
bution," "data processing," "manufacturing," "research and devel-
opment," or "warehousing" as those terms are defined in section
171.751;203
(2) it creates a minimum of 10 "qualifying jobs" as that term is defined
in section 171.751;204 and
(3) it pays an average weekly wage, in the year when the credit is
claimed, of at least 110 percent of the county average weekly wage
where the qualifying jobs are located. 20 5
The credit equals twenty-five percent of the total wages and salaries
paid by the corporation for the qualifying jobs for the reporting period
and must be taken in five equal installments over five consecutive re-
ports.206 Like the other credit incentives, this one is limited. The total
credit claimed may not exceed fifty percent of the amount of franchise tax
197. See id. § 171.723(d).
198. See id. § 171.724.
199. See id. § 171.725.
200. See id. § 171.727. Several similar report-by-the-comptroller provisions were en-
acted in 1999, in response, to some degree, to critics arguing that the state should not retain
tax credits without being able to demonstrate the value of such credits.
201. See id. § 171.724(c).
202. See id. §§ 171.751-.761.
203. See id. § 171.751 (note that these definitions do not necessarily match definitions
for these terms that appear elsewhere in the Tax Code; see e.g., "data processing" as de-
fined for sales tax purposes by TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0035).
204. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.751 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
205. See id. § 171.752(a)(3).
206. See id. §§ 171.753-.754.
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due before any other applicable credits, and the aggregate credits for re-
search expenses, job creation activities, and capital investments cannot
exceed the amount of franchise tax due for the reporting period after any
other applicable credits.20 7 Any unused credit may be carried forward for
up to five consecutive reporting periods.20 8 For each report in which a
credit is claimed, the corporation must file a statement in a form provided
by the comptroller and demonstrate its eligibility for the credit. 20 9
If, in one of the five years during which equal installments of the credit
are being taken, the number of the corporation's full-time employees falls
below the number of full-time employees that the corporation had in the
year in which the corporation qualified for the credit, the credit will ex-
pire and the corporation will not be able to take any more installments of
the credit.210 This limitation will not affect carryforwards of the credit
other than the installments at issue (for example, carryforwards based on
job creation in another strategic investment area will not be affected). 211
The corporation may not assign or otherwise transfer the credit unless
all of the assets of the corporation are transferred in the same transac-
tion.212 The job creation credit will expire on December 31, 2009, but the
expiration will not affect any unused carryforwards. 21 3 As with the other
new credits, the comptroller will be required to file a report detailing va-
rious information about use of the credit at the beginning of each regular
session of the Legislature. 214 A corporation eligible for this credit will
not be eligible for the research and development credit described
above.215
New subchapter Q of chapter 171 of the Tax Code provides a credit for
corporations in certain lines of business that make significant capital in-
vestments in strategic investment areas on or after January 1, 2000.216
This provision, together with the R&D credit and the job creation credit,
comprise the core of the franchise tax package on which legislators
worked long and hard. To be eligible, a corporation must:
(1) be a qualified business (same definition as for the job creation
credit);
(2) pay an average weekly wage that is at least 110 percent of the
county average weekly wage at the location with respect to which
the credit is claimed;
(3) offer a group health benefit plan to all full-time employees at the
location with respect to which the credit is claimed, for which the
207. See id. § 171.755.
208. See id. § 171.756.
209. See id. § 171.757(a).
210. See id. § 171.757(c).
211. See id. § 171.757(d).
212. See id. § 171.758.
213. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.761 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
214. See id. § 171.759.
215. See id. § 171.755(c).
216. See id. §§ 171.801-.811.
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corporation pays at least eighty percent of the premiums for its
employees; and
(4) make a minimum $500,000 capital investment in depreciable tangi-
ble personal property described in Internal Revenue Code section
1245(a) in a strategic investment area.2 17
The amount of the credit equals seven and one-half percent of the
qualified capital investment and must be taken in five equal installments
over five consecutive reports. 218 The total credit claimed may not exceed
fifty percent of the amount of franchise tax due before any other applica-
ble credits, and the aggregate credits for research expenses, job creation
activities, and capital investments cannot exceed the amount of franchise
tax due for the reporting period after any other applicable credits.
219
Any unused credit may be carried forward for up to five consecutive re-
porting periods.220 For each report in which a credit is claimed, the cor-
poration must file a statement in a form provided by the comptroller and
demonstrate its eligibility for the credit.2 21
If, in one of the five years during which equal installments of the credit
are being taken, the corporation disposes of the qualified capital invest-
ment, moves the qualified capital investment out of the state, or fails to
pay the required minimum average weekly wage, the credit will expire
and the corporation will not be able to take any more installments of the
credit for that qualified capital investment.222 This limitation will not af-
fect carryforwards of the credit other than the installments at issue (for
example, carryforwards based on a qualified capital investment in an-
other strategic investment area will not be affected).223
The corpofation may not assign or otherwise transfer the credit unless
all of the assets of the corporation are transferred in the same transac-
tion.2 24 The capital investment credit will expire on December 31, 2009,
but the expiration will not affect any unused carryforwards. 22 5 As with
the other new credits, the comptroller will be required to file a report
detailing various information about use of the credit at the beginning of
each regular session of the Legislature.22 6 A corporation eligible for this
credit will not be eligible for the franchise tax reduction of taxable capital
for investment in an enterprise zone authorized by section 171.1015.227
Subchapter R, also added to chapter 171 of the Tax Code, provides a
credit for corporations that make contributions to support before and af-
ter school programs conducted by school districts or certain non-profit
217. See id. § 171.802.
218. See id. §§ 171.803-.804.
219. See id. § 171.805.
220. See id. § 171.806.
221. See id. § 171.807(a).
222. See id. § 171.807(c).
223. See id. § 171.807(d).
224. See id. § 171.808.
225. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.811 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
226. See id. § 171.809.
227. See id. § 171.805(c).
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entities on or after January 1, 2000.228 To be eligible, the corporation
must make qualifying expenditures for construction, supplies, or opera-
tion of a school-age child-care program operated by certain nonprofit or-
ganizations, accredited educational facilities, or counties and
municipalities that adopt certain standards of care.229
The amount of the credit is equal to thirty percent of qualifying ex-
penditures but may not exceed more than fifty percent of the amount of
net franchise tax due after application of other credits.230 A corporation
must apply for the credit on a form to be prescribed by the comptroller
with its report for the period for which the credit is claimed.23 1 There is
no carryover of unused credits, and assignment or any other transfer of
the credit is prohibited unless all of the assets of the corporation are
transferred in the same transaction. 232
Several other legislative changes, for example, some "technical amend-
ments," modified various provisions. Similar to the changes made in the
sales tax context, the lengthy requirements for nonprofit hospitals to be
exempt from the franchise tax were deleted and replaced. As revised, the
statute provides that a nonprofit hospital will be exempt from franchise
tax if it provides community benefits that include charity care and gov-
ernment-sponsored indigent health care as set forth in subchapter D,
chapter 311 of the Health and Safety Code. It further specifies that this
requirement may be satisfied by a donation of money to the Texas
Healthy Kids Corporation established by chapter 109 of the Health and
Safety Code if the money donated is to be used for a purpose stated in
section 109.033(c) 2 33 of the Health and Safety Code, and not more than
ten percent of the charity care required under any provision of section
311.045 of the Health and Safety Code is satisfied by such a donation.
In one of several changes the Legislature labeled as a "clarification" of
existing law, the Legislature added new subsection (i) to section 171.110
of the Tax Code to state a presumption that a person is an officer of a
corporation (for purposes of the compensation add-back) if the person
holds an office created by the board of directors or under the corporate
charter or bylaws and "has legal authority to bind the corporation with
third parties by executing contracts or other legal documents. '234
New subsection 171.110(j) provides that a corporation may rebut the
presumption by showing that the person "does not participate or have
authority to participate in significant policy making aspects of the corpo-
rate operations. '235 To some extent, this amendment is designed to allow
non-bank taxpayers to follow standards similar to those applicable to
228. See id. §§ 171.831-.836.
229. See id. § 171.833.
230. See id. §§ 171.834(a), (c).
231. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.835 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
232. See id. §§ 171.834(b), 171.836.
233. See id. § 109.033(c).
234. Id. § 171.110(i).
235. Id. § 171.1100).
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banks, that is, to exclude from the compensation add-back certain per-
sonnel who are not "real" officers. Given the several pending cases, both
judicial and administrative, on the issue of officer and director add-backs,
it is unlikely that this new language will resolve the controversy. 236
Once upon a time, banks were subject to a local property tax on bank
stock rather than to franchise tax. In 1984, when the franchise tax was
extended to banks, Texas law did not allow branch banking or interstate
banking; at the time, the state adopted the franchise tax requirement that
a bank source interest and dividends to the bank's "commercial domi-
cile." With the arrival of interstate banking, however, the location of
payor rule as applied to banks produced different results than it had in
earlier days. For example, banks that had been Texas-based at one time
but were no longer Texas-based were able to source their interest and
dividends to their non-Texas commercial domicile. By contrast, banks
with Texas headquarters continued to source their dividends and interest
to Texas, even if those dividends were from out-of-state banking activity.
To put Texas banks and non-Texas banks on a more even basis-as well
as to put banks under the same location of payor rules as other taxpay-
ers-the Legislature modified several provisions of the Tax Code that
deal with banking corporations so that that they, as well as savings and
loan associations, are no longer subject to a different location of payor
rule than other taxpayers; the banking industry supported these changes.
To accomplish this goal, the Legislature repealed section 171.1031237 and
amended several other sections.238
One of the few cases to discuss Tax Code section 171.1061,239 Decision
37,231,240 follows the comptroller's policy of construing unitary income
broadly and finding that sales of intangible assets fall within the definition
of unitary income. The facts of this case involve a corporation that, prior
to merging into another corporation, sold certain proprietary technical
information, patent rights, and copyrights to affiliated foreign corpora-
tions doing business entirely outside the United States. At issue was
whether the corporation's gain from the sale of these intangibles was sub-
ject to apportionment; the taxpayer argued that because the sale of in-
tangibles was unrelated to the corporation's in-Texas enterprise
(development and sale of software), the intangibles could not be included
in the apportioned tax base. The administrative law judge concluded,
however, that the corporation's Texas business activity, which involved
236. These statutory changes track regulatory changes made in 1998. The regulatory
changes, like the statutory changes, were described as clarifications; however, they ap-
peared to reflect a change in comptroller interpretation of the original statutory language.
Notwithstanding this change in verbiage, the comptroller's hearings attorneys appear to
view the change as virtually without meaning as they continue to assert that virtually every-
one (with the possible exception of investment bankers) who has the title of "officer" is an
officer for purposes of the add-back.
237. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1031 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
238. See id. §§ 171.001, 171.106, 171.259, 171.260.
239. See id. § 171.1061.
240. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,231 (June 2, 1999).
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the development and sale of software used worldwide by the oil and gas
industry, "apparently related" to the income from the sale of proprietary
technical information and other intangibles; therefore, the income quali-
fied on its face as unitary income subject to apportionment "when viewed
within the context of the 'unitary business principle,' set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Allied Signal, Inc."'241 Although there
continues to be scant interpretation of this section, what interpretation
exists (including the directions on the franchise tax form242) indicate, con-
sistent with oral confirmation by comptroller representatives during the
Survey period, that the comptroller treats sales of intangibles as produc-
ing unitary income. The disadvantage for taxpayers is that such income
may not be removed from the apportionable tax base. The advantage for
taxpayers, at least for those whose commercial domicile is Texas, is that
the comptroller appears to recognize that such intangible income should
not be allocated entirely to Texas.
Decision 38,005243 involves a taxpayer who argued that including gross
receipts from food sales for earned surplus purposes but not for taxable
capital purposes was unconstitutional. However, the administrative law
judge held in favor of the comptroller, noting that the Texas Tax Code
explicitly provides in section 171.104244 for an exclusion of receipts from
food shipped from outside Texas, but the Tax Code does not include a
corresponding exemption for the earned surplus.245
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. APPLICATION OF THE TAx/EXEMPTIONS
The Austin Court of Appeals, in Circle C Child Development Center,
Inc. v. Travis Central Appraisal District,246 held that a child development
center did not qualify for the school exemption under section 11.21 of the
Tax Code 247 because the center was not used exclusively for educational
functions.248 The child development center primarily serviced children
age four and under, but also offered an after-school program for school-
age children. Section 11.21 provides a property tax exemption for build-
ings and tangible personal property used exclusively for educational func-
tions. 249 The center asserted that it qualified for the exemption because
its property is used as a school with age-appropriate education. Although
the center was licensed as a "day care center," the center believed that
241. Id. (quoting Allied Signal, Inc. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992)).
242. These directions for Item 24 provide that "income is presumed to be unitary."
243. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,005 (Mar. 10, 1999).
244. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.104 (Vernon 1992).
245. See also Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,607 (Oct. 13, 1998) (discussing
officer and director, add-back, stock options, and interpretation of the phrase "to the ex-
tent excluded in federal taxable income").
246. 981 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, no pet. h.).
247. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.21 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
248. See Circle C, 981 S.W.2d at 487.
249. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.21(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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the license should not be viewed as a negative factor in determining
whether it qualified for the school exemption.250 The court concluded
that the center did not qualify for the school exemption, reasoning that
the center operated primarily as a child care facility and secondarily as an
educational facility.251 In making this determination, the court relied on
the fact that custodial care was a substantial component of the center's
programs, as is evidenced by its hours of operation that are much longer
than normal school hours.252
In Fullers Jewelry, Inc. v. Dallas Central Appraisal District,253 the Dal-
las Court of Appeals addressed the determination of market value of in-
ventory. Under section 23.12(a) of the Tax Code, 254 the market value of
inventory for property tax purposes is the price for which the inventory
would sell as a unit to a purchaser continuing the business.255 In Fullers
Jewelry, the trial court held that the market value of the inventory at issue
equaled the value of the inventory as shown on Fullers' books.256 Fullers
contended that the trial court incorrectly interpreted section 23.12(a) to
mean that, as a matter of law, book value equals market value. Fullers
believed that its book value overstated the market value of inventory for
property tax purposes, as its expert witness asserted that the market value
of the inventory was forty-three percent of its cost. 257 The court of ap-
peals rejected Fullers' contention, concluding that the trial court merely
250. See Circle C, 981 S.W.2d at 486.
251. See id. The court noted that custodial care of pre-school age children is always
substantial. Thus, the court implies that it would be difficult for any pre-school program
that offers full-day service to qualify for the school exemption. See id.
252. See id. at 487. In another case addressing whether a taxpayer is entitled to a prop-
erty tax exemption, the Beaumont Court of Appeals, in Texas VIA Elderly Housing, Inc. v.
Montgomery County Appraisal District, 990 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no
pet. h.), held that a nonprofit organization claiming a charitable exemption under section
11.18 of the Tax Code did not qualify for the exemption because its articles of incorpora-
tion did not direct that on dissolution its assets be transferred to the state or to another
charitable organization qualifying under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.
See id. at 940-41. Rather, the articles provided that on dissolution the entity's assets could
be transferred to any for-profit entity or individual so long as the conveyance is for fair
value and the remaining assets are conveyed to a similar non-profit organization. See id. at
939 n.2. This case emphasizes the strict construction applied to exemptions and that an
exemption can be lost by failing to apply carefully the requirements of the exemption
under section 11.18.
253. No. 05-96-01776-CV, 1999 WL 199341 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 12, 1999, no pet.
h.) (not designated for publication).
254. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.12(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
255. See id.
256. Fullers Jewelry, 1999 WL 199341, at *4.
257. See id. Fullers also contended that the evidence was insufficient to support the
trial court's finding that the market value of Fullers' inventory equaled its book value. See
id. In support of Fullers' position, Fullers relied on: (i) testimony that Fullers did not
measure the book value of its inventory under generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP), and (ii) the testimony of Fullers' expert witness that jewelry inventories usually
trade for forty to sixty percent of cost. See id. at *2. In rejecting Fullers' contention, the
court appeared to give weight to the fact that the Dallas Central Appraisal District's expert
witnesses testified that the use of GAAP usually results in a conservative estimate of value
and that Fullers' expert relied on forced sales in determining that jewelry inventories usu-
ally sell for a large discount from cost. See id. at *5.
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made a finding of fact and not a legal conclusion that, in this case, the
market value of Fullers' inventory equaled its book value.2 5 8
B. PROCEDURE
Two interesting cases concerning the much litigated provisions of sec-
tion 25.25(c) of the Tax Code 259 were decided during the Annual Survey
period. Section 25.25(c) provides for the late correction of appraisal rolls
under three limited circumstances: (1) certain clerical errors, (2) multiple
appraisals of a property, and (3) the inclusion of property that does not
exist in the form or at the location described in the appraisal roll. 260 In
Second Avenue Properties, Ltd. v. Dallas Central Appraisal District,26 1 the
taxpayer sought to correct the appraisal roll for unimproved property
under section 25.25(c)(3) because of its belief that the property did not
exist in the form described in the appraisal roll. Specifically, the taxpayer
asserted that the rolls contained an inadequate description of the unim-
proved property because they did not list the property as having gasoline
contamination, which rendered seventy-five percent of the property un-
buildable. 262 The court rejected the taxpayer's assertion, concluding that
the physical description of the property as "land" was sufficient.263 The
court reasoned that a description of "form" does not include a description
of the property's use or factors influencing value.264
In Handy Hardware Wholesale, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dis-
trict,265 the Houston Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas con-
sidered what is probably a closer call than Second Avenue. The case in
Handy Hardware concerned real property that included a warehouse. In
1995, the appraisal district discovered that the warehouse was over
200,000 square feet, rather than the approximately 20,000 square feet
listed in the appraisal district's records. 266 Thus, the appraisal district re-
lied on section 25.25(c)(1) (clerical errors)267 in attempting to increase
the subject property's value for the five previous years. The appraisal roll
for the property was actually correct because it did not list the square
footage of the warehouse; rather, the error was set forth in the appraisal
258. See id.
259. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 25.25(c) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
260. See id.
261. No. 05-96-0110-CV, 1999 WL 280705 (Tex. App.-Dallas May 7, 1999, no pet.).
262. See id. at *1.
263. See id. at *2. Any other conclusion by the court in this case would enable virtually
any property owner asserting that the property's condition affected its value (such as an
improved property in poor condition) to make a rational argument that it qualified under
section 25.25(c).
264. See id. at *2. Indeed, the Dallas Court of Appeals ruled in 1995 that the "form" of
property means "its identification as a type of property..., such as real property, personal
property or some other physical description of the property on the appraisal roll, other
than its appraised value or its use." Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. G.T.E. Directories
Corp., 905 S.W.2d 318, 321 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied).
265. 985 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
266. See id. at 618.
267. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 25.25(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
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district's supporting records.268 Handy Hardware contended that section
25.25(c)(1) did not apply because of its belief that a "clerical error" must
appear on the appraisal roll itself.269 Handy Hardware relied on three
cases in this regard: (1) in G. T.E. Directories, the court of appeals held
that under section 25.25(c)(3) the form of property was not listed incor-
rectly merely because the appraisal roll did not specify that a ground shift
had rendered the building useless;270 (2) in Collin County Appraisal Dis-
trict v. Northeast Dallas Associates,271 the court of appeals held that sec-
tion 25.25(c)(1) did not apply when the landowner improperly indicated
that the property was owned by a foreigner and thus was not eligible for
open-space land appraisal; 272 and (3) in Matagorda County Appraisal
District v. Conquest Exploration Co.,273 the court of appeals held that a
listing of improper mineral working interest percentages was not a cleri-
cal error as a matter of law.274
The court considered G.T.E. Directories not to be controlling because
it concerned section 25.25(c)(3) 275 and not section 25.25(c)(1), and it con-
sidered Northeast Dallas Associates to be unpersuasive because that court
interpreted the clerical error provision under section 25.25(c)(1) to apply
only to errors by the appraisal district, not the taxpayer, and thus could
have reached a different conclusion if the same error had been made by
the appraisal district.276 Although the court believed that Conquest Ex-
ploration provided strong support for the taxpayer's argument in Handy
Hardware, the court decided that the conclusion and reasoning in Com-
disco, Inc. v. Tarrant County Appraisal District277 was more persuasive. 278
In Comdisco, the taxpayer sought relief under section 25.25(c)(1) because
it overpaid property taxes due to a mistaken rendition form that listed the
value of the taxpayer's property at $13 million instead of $1.3 million.279
The court granted relief even though the "clerical error" was in a form
that underlies the appraisal roll as opposed to an error in the appraisal
roll itself.28 0 The court in Handy Hardware concluded that if the prop-
erty owner can use section 25.25(c)(1) to correct an error that is not actu-
ally in the appraisal roll, so should the appraisal district.281
The Attorney General, in Letter Opinion 98-083,282 addressed the
268. See Handy Hardware, 985 S.W.2d at 619.
269. See id.
270. See G.T.E. Directories, 905 S.W.2d at 319.
271. 855 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, no writ).
272. See id. at 848.
273. 788 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
274. See id. at 691-92.
275. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 25.25(c)(3) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
276. See Handy Hardware, 985 S.W.2d at 620.
277. 927 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ ref'd).
278. See Handy Hardware, 985 S.W.2d at 620.
279. See Comdisco, 927 S.W.2d at 326.
280. See id. at 327.
281. See Handy Hardware, 985 S.W.2d at 621.
282. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO 98-083 (1998).
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amendment of section 33.52 of the Tax Code 28 3 by three different bills
during the 1997 session of the Texas Legislature.284 Prior to its amend-
ment in 1999, section 33.52 addressed the use of foreclosure proceeds to
pay current tax year property taxes. The three bills at issue each
amended section 33.52 in different and meaningful ways. House Bills
2587 and 3306 permitted payment of the unpaid tax for the current year
from foreclosure proceeds, 285 but House Bill 2622 required payment from
foreclosure proceeds of all taxes (in addition to current year's taxes) ac-
crued in the future until the time of the sale. 286 House Bills 2587 and
3306 differed in that House Bill 3306 gave the judge discretion to deter-
mine whether foreclosure proceeds would be used to pay current year's
taxes, but House Bill 2587 gave the discretion to the taxing unit. 287 The
Attorney General stated that if amendments to the same statute are en-
acted during the same legislative session without referring to each other,
the amendments must be harmonized with each other if possible.288 If
harmonization is not possible, then the bill with the latest date of enact-
ment prevails. 289 In this case, House Bills 2587 and 2622 were each en-
acted on the same date, one day after House Bill 3306; however, House
Bill 2622 was enacted later in the day than House Bill 2587.290
In Atascosa County v. Atascosa County Appraisal District,29' the Texas
Supreme Court held that an appraisal district is required to back-appraise
and assess taxes on property erroneously exempted for the past five
years, irrespective of the reason for the erroneous exemption.292 In Atas-
cosa County, the county and the school district challenged the property
tax exemption granted to a hospital for years 1990 through 1995 and ulti-
mately won. 293 The county and the school district requested that the ap-
praisal review board add the property's value to the roll for each of these
years, but the appraisal review board revoked the exemption for only
283. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.52 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
284. See Act of May 25, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 906, § 8, sec. 33.52, 1997 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2854, 2855; Act of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1111, § 3, sec. 33.52, 1997 Tex.
Gen. Laws 4246, 4246; Act of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 981, § 2, sec. 33.52, 1997
Tex. Gen. Laws 3051, 3052.
285. See Act of May 25, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 906, § 8, sec. 33.52, 1997 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2854, 2855; Act of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1111, § 3, sec. 33.52, 1997 Tex.
Gen. Laws 4246, 4246.
286. See Act of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 981, § 2, sec. 33.52, 1997 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3051, 3052.
287. See Act of May 25, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 906, § 8, sec. 33.52, 1997 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2854, 2855; Act of May 26, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1111, § 3, sec. 33.52, 1997 Tex.
Gen. Laws 4246, 4246.
288. See Tex. Att'y Gen. LO 98-083 at *4 (1998).
289. See id.
290. See id. In 1999, the Texas Legislature went a completely different direction by
amending section 33.52 to provide that foreclosure proceeds may be used to pay only taxes
(and related penalties and interest) that are delinquent. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.52
(Vernon Supp. 2000).
291. 990 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. 1999).
292. See id. at 259.
293. See id. at 257.
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year 1995.294 The court held that section 11.43(i) of the Tax Code295
mandates that the appraisal district back-appraise and assess erroneously
exempted property.296 The appraisal district argued that section 11.43(i),
which requires back-appraisal if the appraisal district "discovers" an erro-
neous exemption, was intended to apply only if the improper granting of
the exemption was due to an inadvertent action.297 The supreme court
rejected this argument, reasoning that the term "discover" has a meaning
much broader than the one given to it by the appraisal district.298 Thus,
the chief appraiser's learning that the exemption had been improperly
granted in the past (for whatever reason), even if the chief appraiser
knew of the exemption when granted, was still a "discovery. '299
In Harris County Appraisal District v. Coastal Liquids Transportation,
L.P., 300 the Houston Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas held
that a foreign limited partnership that transacted business in Texas but
had not registered in Texas could still defend the valuation of its property
for property tax purposes and file suit to challenge the alleged overvalua-
tion of its property. 30 1 Under Texas law, a foreign limited partnership
transacting business in Texas cannot maintain an action or suit in Texas
until it has registered in Texas and paid the appropriate fees. 30 2 How-
ever, a foreign limited partnership's failure to register "does not impair
... defense by the foreign limited partnership of any action, suit or pro-
ceeding in any Texas court." 30 3 The court concluded that the limited
partnership's acts with respect to the property tax valuation of its Texas
property were defensive in nature, and even though the partnership was
the titular plaintiff, it was more in the essence of a defendant because
filing suit was the only way to defend against what it believed was an
excessive appraisal. 304
294. See id.
295. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.43(i) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
296. See Atascosa County, 990 S.W.2d at 257.
297. See id. at 258.
298. See id. at 258-59. The Texas Supreme Court also concluded that the county and
school district had standing to sue the appraisal district to cause it to perform its duty to
back-appraise and back-assess under sections 41.03(2) and (3) of the Tax Code, which al-
low a taxing unit to challenge an exclusion of property from the rolls or the granting of an
exemption. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.03 (Vernon Supp. 2000). The inability to chal-
lenge the appraisal district's failure to back-assess would render taxing units' challenges to
exemptions much less meaningful and thus would be inconsistent with the intent of the
statutes. See Atascosa County, 990 S.W.2d at 259-60.
299. See id. at 259. The court also concluded that the statute of limitations did not bar
the taxing unit's challenge to the appraisal district's failure to back-assess because a back-
assessment due to an improper exemption is a current year tax, and thus the statute of
limitations requiring challenges to appraisal district decisions to be made in the tax year in
question is not applicable. See id. at 260.
300. 7 S.W.3d 183 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. filed).
301. See id. at 187.
302. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1, § 9.07(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
303. See id. § 9.07(b)(3).
304. See Coastal Liquids, 7 S.W.3d at 187. The court also held that 1995 amendments to
section 42.015 of the Tax Code enabling lessees to challenge property valuations in certain





Over sixty property tax bills were passed during the 76th Texas Legisla-
ture.30 5 A vast majority of these bills addressed procedural matters. Al-
though many of the procedural changes are meaningful, probably the
most significant property tax legislation in 1999 addressed exemptions
and special appraisals of property.
In November of 1999, voters approved an amendment to the Texas
Constitution allowing the Texas Legislature to exempt from property tax
any leased motor vehicles not held by the lessee primarily for the produc-
tion of income.306 However, the Texas Legislature did not enact during
1999 any enabling legislation with respect to this exemption; thus, Texas
residents leasing their automobiles must wait for the 2001 regular session
before the Texas Legislature can consider actually adopting such an ex-
emption. Voters also approved an amendment to the Texas Constitution
that provides that a public charity is no longer required to be a "purely
public charity" in order to be eligible for a property tax exemption as a
public charity.30 7 As a result of this amendment, the Texas Legislature
may exempt institutions that engage primarily in public functions but that
also conduct auxiliary activities to support their charitable functions.30 8
The Texas Legislature added a new special appraisal provision for cer-
tain timber land.30 9 The special appraisal applies to timber land on which
timber harvesting is restricted: (1) for aesthetic or conservation purposes,
(2) to provide benefits or protections for plant and certain animal wild-
life, or (3) to protect water quality or preserve a waterway.3 10 In addi-
tion, land qualifies for special appraisal under this provision if the timber
was harvested from the land in a year in which the land qualified for
special appraisal or if the land has been regenerated for timber produc-
tion to the degree of intensity generally accepted in the area for commer-
cial timber land.31' Land qualifying under this special appraisal provision
is valued at fifty percent of the appraised value that would have otherwise
been determined. 312 As with other special appraisal provisions, rollback
taxes apply if the use changed. 313 This legislation also added timber to
the items that qualify for the farm products exemption under section
11.16. 314
The tax abatement statute was amended to provide that counties may
enter into tax abatement agreements having different terms than tax
305. 1999 Texas Property Tax Law Changes, STATEMENT (Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts)
Aug., 1999.
306. See TEX. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1(d), (e) (amended 1999).
307. See id. art. VIII, § 2(a) (amended 1999).
308. See id.
309. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 23.9801-.9807 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
310. See id. § 23.9802.
311. See id. § 23.9802(b).
312. See id. § 23.9803.
313. See id. § 23.9807.
314. See id. § 11.16(c).
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abatement agreements entered into by municipalities. 315 Prior to this
amendment, abatement agreements entered into by a county could have
different terms than the abatement agreement entered into by the rele-
vant municipality only if the property were located in an enterprise
zone. 316 New section 311.0125 now allows a taxing unit other than a
school district to enter into a tax abatement agreement with an owner of
property within a tax increment financing (TIF) reinvestment zone if all
taxing units participating in the TIF agree.317
The Tax Code was also amended to exempt incomplete real property
improvements owned by charitable organizations, youth development as-
sociations, religious organizations, and certain other exempt organiza-
tions. 318 The incomplete improvements are exempt for up to three years
if certain conditions are met.319 Section 11.18 was amended to expand
the types of charitable functions that qualify under the charitable exemp-
tion by adding the provision of support to the elderly or handicapped to
the list of qualifying activities.32° The homestead exemption for individu-
als age sixty-five and over now applies for the entire year that the person
turns sixty-five instead of being pro rated as before.321 New section
11.183 was added to provide an exemption for associations providing as-
sistance to ambulatory health care centers.322
One of the noteworthy procedural property tax amendments also
touches on exemptions. The Tax Code was amended to provide that the
filing of certain property tax exemptions, such as religious organizations,
private schools, charitable organizations, and veterans' organizations, will
be accepted so long as the application is made within five years of the tax
year in which the taxes for which the exemption is claimed were im-
posed.323 Prior law allowed for these late applications to be made within
six years of the tax year in which taxes are imposed.324
New section 21.055 of the Tax Code requires appraisal districts to allo-
cate to Texas the portion of the value of an aircraft used for a business
purpose that fairly reflects its use in Texas.325 This section presumes that
this fair allocation should be done based on the number of take-offs in
315. See id. § 312.206(a). This amendment also effectively allows a county to grant a
tax abatement even if the relevant municipality does not desire to grant a meaningful tax
abatement, so long as the city is willing to grant a 0.1% abatement in the property tax for
one year.
316. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 312.206(a) (Vernon 1992) (prior to 1999 amendment).
317. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 311.0125 (Vernon Supp. 2000). Prior to this amend-
ment, in order to grant a tax abatement to property within the boundaries of a tax incre-
ment reinvestment zone, the zone would have to be amended to delete the abated property
from the TIF zone.
318. See id. §§ 11.18, 11.19, 11.20(f), 11.21, 11.23.
319. See id. §§ 11.18, 11.19, 11.20(f), 11.21, 11.23.
320. See id. § 11.18(d).
321. See id.
322. See id. § 11.183.
323. See id. §§ 11.433, 11.434, 11.435, 11.438.
324. See id. §§ 11.433, 11.434, 11.435, 11.438 (Vernon 1992) (prior to 1999 amendment).
325. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.055 (Vernon Supp. 2000); Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No.
JC-0180 (1999) (ruling that amended § 21.055 is not retroactive).
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Texas as compared to the total number of take-offs. 326 This provision
does not apply to commercial aircraft.327
In yet another attempt to address the ad valorem taxation of property
lying within overlapping appraisal districts, section 6.025 was amended to
provide that appraisal districts with properties that are appraised by more
than one appraisal district must share information, eliminate differences
in the information set forth in their appraisal records, and, to the extent
practicable, coordinate their appraisal activities so as to encourage the
districts' arriving at the same appraised value of the property.328 The
provision requiring the averaging of appraised values if the appraisal dis-
tricts disagreed on the value of overlapping property was repealed. 329
New section 23.24 provides that if real property is appraised by a
method that takes into account the value of furniture, fixtures, and equip-
ment located on such real property, then such tangible personal property
is not subject to additional appraisal as personal property.330 Amended
section 23.0101 now requires the appraisal district to use the most appro-
priate appraisal method in determining fair market value, not the method
the appraisal district "considers" the most appropriate. 331 New section
31.081 provides that the purchaser of a business is required to withhold
from the purchase price sufficient money to pay the personal property
taxes (and interest and penalties) of the business unless the seller has
provided the purchaser with either a tax receipt showing all such taxes
are paid or tax certificates showing that no such taxes are due.332 The
purchaser can request a tax certificate or statement from the relevant tax-
ing unit(s), and if they are not received within ten days from the request,
the purchaser is relieved of liability under this section. 333
Section 33.07 was amended to provide that taxing units may impose a
fifteen percent collection fee on any delinquent taxes. 334 New section
33.43 removes current and later imposed taxes from a delinquent tax
judgment.335 Section 34.01 was amended significantly to alter the rules
on the sale of property at a tax foreclosure sale.336 Section 34.02 provides
that the proceeds of a tax foreclosure sale shall be disbursed in the fol-
lowing order: (1) advertising costs and court costs; (2) fees due the of-
ficer conducting the sale; (3) taxes, penalties, and interest owed to the
taxing units; (4) any other amounts owed to the taxing units; and (5) ex-
326. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 21.055(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
327. See id. § 21.055(c).
328. See id. § 6.025.
329. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 6.025(d)-(f) (Vernon 1992) (repealed 1999).
330. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.24 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
331. See id. § 23.0101.
332. See id. § 31.081. This statute is a significant trap for the unwary purchaser. The
statute also raises many unanswered questions, such as whether a merger is a purchase of a
business or an interest in a business and whether a purchase of a partnership interest in a
partnership that owns personal property is an indirect purchaser of a business.
333. See id. § 31.081(d).
334. See id. § 33.07.
335. See id. § 33.43.
336. See id. § 34.01.
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cess amounts, if any, to the court clerk.337 Finally, section 34.04 was
amended to reduce to two years (from seven years) the period during
which a person can claim excess proceeds from a property tax foreclosure
sale.33
8
IV. PROCEDURE AND LIABIILTY
A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
One of the most significant taxpayer victories of the Annual Survey
period involves procedure and statutes of limitation. In Fleming Foods of
Texas, Inc. v. Rylander,339 the Texas Supreme Court held that the Tax
Code permits an indirect taxpayer to seek refunds of sales tax from the
state.340 Although this case is a taxpayer victory, it may create a trap for
the unwary (or even the wary). Taxpayers who had intended (as required
by pre-Fleming comptroller interpretation) to rely on their vendor's stat-
ute of limitations may be surprised to discover that comptroller repre-
sentatives have indicated that the vendor's statute of limitations is
irrelevant post-Fleming, so that a taxpayer whose own statute of limita-
tions has run may face challenges to a refund claim.341
The Austin Court of Appeals held that a letter from the comptroller
notifying the taxpayer of the final results of an audit constituted a defi-
ciency determination that triggered the six-month limitation period for
filing a refund request. This case, Formosa Plastics Corp. of Texas, v.
Sharp,342 illustrates the sometimes confusing complexity of Texas's stat-
utes of limitations rules. Formosa had argued that because its refund re-
quest was filed less than a year after it overpaid its 1989 taxes, it should
be entitled to a full refund of the payment with respect to its 1989 year.
Unfortunately for Texas taxpayers, Texas law does not parallel the federal
law in providing a period of time after which an overpayment is made in
which a taxpayer can automatically seek a refund. Therefore, taxpayers
who make payments with respect to past periods must be careful to en-
sure that they make the payments under protest, in connection with a
request for redetermination, or in some other way that protects taxpayers
from the statute of limitations.343
B. PERSONAL LIABILITY AND OTHER PITFALLS
Judicial cases continue to warn taxpayers about the dangers of failing
to remit collected taxes. Two recent cases involving individual liability
337. See id. § 34.02.
338. See id. § 34.04.
339. 6 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. 1999).
340. See supra note 9 and accompanying text for a discussion of Fleming Foods.
341. Detrimental reliance arguments and the comptroller's newly enacted settlement
authority may provide some relief to taxpayers facing this challenge.
342. 979 S.W.2d 410 (Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet. denied).
343. Note that there are specific requirements for mailing payments under protest and
requesting a redetermination hearing.
2000] 1333
SMU LAW REVIEW
for unpaid sales taxes of a corporation should send a word of caution to
corporate officers and directors. Texas v. Mink344 focused on a corporate
taxpayer that failed to remit collected sales taxes. The state brought suit
against Mink, an officer and director of the corporate taxpayer, under the
trust fund provision.345 The trial court granted Mink's motion for sum-
mary judgment and denied the comptroller's. In the ensuing appeal, the
appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judg-
ment for the state.346 In reaching its decision, the appellate court re-
viewed the trust fund provision in force during the audit period; the
applicable section provided that a person who collects or receives taxes
does so in trust for the state and is liable to the state for the full amount
collected. 347 The court held that the term "person" in the trust fund pro-
vision included a corporate taxpayer, and that any breach of this provi-
sion by a corporation is through the conduct of a corporate agent.348
Based on the undisputed facts that Mink was a signatory on the corpora-
tion's bank account in which the collected sales taxes were deposited and
he controlled the financial affairs of the corporation, the court ruled that
Mink caused the corporation to breach its fiduciary duty, making him
liable for the taxes. 349 The court specifically declined to rule on the issue
of whether the status of a corporate officer or director could, by itself, be
the basis of personal liability.350
Subsequent to this decision, the Austin Court of Appeals heard an-
other case with similar facts, Marken Enterprises Inc. v. Texas.351 The
Marken trial court found the corporate taxpayer and the corporation's
owner, who was president and director, jointly and severally liable for
sales taxes that were collected but never remitted to the state. The comp-
troller argued that, because the owner had breached his fiduciary duty to
the state and committed the tort of conversion by failing to remit the
taxes, the owner was individually liable under the trust fund provision. 352
Based on the State v. Mink reasoning, 353 as well as on its own conclusion
that using the tax funds for other purposes constitutes conversion, the
court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the owner was jointly liable for
the unremitted sales taxes based on his tortious conduct.354 Once again,
however, the court noted that it was not basing the owner's liability on his
344. 990 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).
345. See Act of July 21, 1987, 70th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 1, § 1, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 1
(hereinafter the trust fund provision) (amended 1995) (current version at TEX. TAX CODE
ANN. § 111,016 (Vernon Supp. 2000)).
346. See Mink, 990 S.W.2d at 784.
347. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.015 (Vernon 1992).
348. See Mink, 990 S.W.2d at 783.
349. See id. at 783-84.
350. See id. at 784.
351, No. 03-98-00352-CV, 1999 WL 162809 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 25, 1999, no pet.
h.).
352. See id. at *3.
353. See Mink, 990 S.W.2d 779.
354. See Marken, 1999 WL 162809 at *3.
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status as a corporate officer.355
Several comptroller hearings provide a continuing warning to "succes-
sor" taxpayers who acquire businesses that the acquirer may step into the
shoes of its target corporation for purposes of paying outstanding (even if
not yet assessed) sales and franchise taxes. As during past Survey peri-
ods, several of the cases focus on how many assets the taxpayer must buy
before it is considered a successor and is required to pay its "predeces-
sor's" tax liabilities.356 The tax division frequently takes an aggressive
view of what comprises the purchase of a business, arguing in one case,
for example, that the purchase of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion (FCC) license of a radio station, by itself, constitutes "the purchase
of a business" for purposes of successor liability. Based on the facts of
this case, Decision 37,326,357 the administrative law judge concluded that
he did not need to address this assertion, because the taxpayer had pur-
chased more than simply the FCC license. Although the case's holding is
a fact-based one, it illustrates that a purchase of far less than all the assets
of a business may, in the comptroller's view, give rise to successor
liability.358
Another successor liability case, Decision 37,737,359 involved an unu-
sual fact pattern that, the taxpayer argued unsuccessfully, did not consti-
tute a purchase of assets sufficient to trigger successor liability. In this
case, one vending company ("Buyer") agreed to pay certain amounts
owed by another vending company ("Seller") as commissions to a univer-
sity, in exchange for Seller's thirteen snack machines located on the cam-
pus. The administrative law judge held that the Buyer's assumption of
Seller's liability constituted a purchase of assets, so that Buyer became
liable for Seller's unpaid sales taxes. The message: assumption of debt
can constitute consideration for sales tax purposes.
The tax division failed to prevail in its debt-assumption argument
against the taxpayer in Decision 38,019.360 The taxpayer in this case had
taken over the physical location of his brother's business, taken over the
debt associated with six trucks that had been used by his brother's busi-
ness, and had paid some of his brother's business debts to certain vendors
with whom both he and his brother did business. Based on these facts,
355. See id. at *3 n4
356. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.020 (Vernon 1992), which provides that when a
person sells "the business or the stock of goods of the business" to a successor, the succes-
sor is to withhold an amount of the purchase price sufficient to pay the tax amounts due.
A purchaser who fails to withhold the amount and who fails to follow procedures for re-
questing a no-tax-due statement from the comptroller, is liable for the amount of the pred-
ecessor's taxes, to the extent of the purchase price. See also 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.7
(1999).
357. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,326 (Feb. 3, 1999).
358. The taxpayer had argued that it purchased only some assets from the radio station
at issue; it had also purchased assets from other stations to form its own new station with
new call letters and a new format (religious talk format instead of modern rock music). See
id.
359. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,737 (Mar. 18, 1999).
360. Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 38,019 (Sept. 2, 1999).
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the tax division asserted that the taxpayer was responsible for his
brother's unpaid sales taxes. The judge, however, looked carefully
enough at the facts to determine that the debt assumed was not that of
the brother's business, but was instead that of the brothers' father. Simi-
larly, the leasehold obligation the taxpayer assumed was the father's obli-
gation, not the brother's. Moreover, there was no agreement for
purchase, and no inventory or assets were acquired from the alleged
predecessor company. Indeed, the only amount paid by the taxpayer for
his brother's liabilities was the amount paid to the common vendors;
however, as the judge noted, that payment was not consideration to the
"predecessor company. '361 Rather, the payment was simply a means of
enabling the taxpayer to purchase items from vendors who refused to sell
to a family member until the brother's business debts had been paid.
Several cases illustrate the repercussions of losing a corporate charter
as a result of the failure to pay franchise taxes. In Yetiv v. Harris County
Appraisal District,362 for example, the plaintiff was a sole shareholder of a
corporation that had filed a property tax suit against the Houston County
Appraisal District. The appraisal district successfully moved to dismiss
the suit on the ground that the corporation forfeited its charter to pay
franchise taxes. The court concluded that Yetiv could have maintained
the suit on behalf of the corporation in a representative capacity, but be-
cause he failed to do so, the case should be dismissed.363 Administrative
decisions further confirm that officers and directors may be held respon-
sible for corporate debts where a corporation loses its charter to do
business.364
C. TAXPAYER RIGHTS-LEGISLATIVE AND
ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Having campaigned on the promise that taxpayers deserve more rights
in Texas, Comptroller Carole Keeton Rylander proposed, and the Texas
Legislature adopted, numerous changes to the Tax Code that involve
both procedure and interest payments by the state (finally!).
The Texas Legislature finally remedied what taxpayers, especially tax-
payers from outside Texas, have been complaining about for years: the
361. See id.
362. No. 14-97-00846-CV, 1999 WL 213239 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 8,
1999, no pet. h.).
363. See id. at *1.
364. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,280 (Sept. 20, 1999) (taxpayers
argued that because the penalty in connection with unpaid taxes was not assessed until
after the company's corporate charter had been reinstated, the officers and directors
should not be liable. The administrative law judge concluded, however, that the late pay-
ment penalty was automatically imposed by statute, without regard to the time the penalty
was actually finally determined to be due); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 37,487
(Nov. 19, 1998) (officers and directors held liable for sales taxes not remitted after the due
date of the 1995 franchise tax report, which the company failed to file. The administrative
law judge noted that the taxpayers submitted no evidence to show that the sales tax debt




fact that Texas does not pay interest on amounts refunded to taxpayers
pursuant to administrative claims for refund. Virtually all other states
(i.e., all other states except Wyoming) pay interest to taxpayers on re-
funds. Texas's failure to pay interest was particularly unfair to taxpayers
caught in the position of trying to decide whether to report their tax lia-
bility in accordance with a pending, unfavorable audit or to continue to
report taxes in a manner consistent with the taxpayer's pre-audit method-
ology. Thus, in the past, the comptroller has essentially required a tax-
payer to choose between a penalty (if the comptroller's position is
ultimately upheld) or making an interest-free loan to the state (if the tax-
payer's position is ultimately upheld). Faced with this Hobson's choice,
taxpayers felt particularly prejudiced in view of the twelve percent inter-
est rate charged by the state on delinquent sales and franchise taxes.
The new provisions not only add the taxpayer-interest section, 365 but
also change the interest rate, which is the same for both taxpayers and the
State, to the prime rate (as published in the Wall Street Journal on the
first working day of January each year) plus one. 366 A refund for a report
due before January 2000 does not accrue interest.367
In the context of administrative proceedings, the comptroller has not
had the authority to settle cases based on typical litigation considerations
such as "hazards of litigation." Although the comptroller's authority to
settle cases continues to be limited, new legislation opens the door a bit
wider for the comptroller and taxpayers to settle cases when litigation
costs are expected to be higher than the amount of taxes owed,368 al-
lowing the comptroller to settle a claim for refund of tax, penalty, or in-
terest if the "total costs of defending a denial of the claim, as conclusively
determined by the comptroller, would exceed the total amount
claimed. '369 The expanded settlement authority provisions are effective
at the end of August 1999, and the interest provisions are effective Janu-
ary 1, 2000. On the one hand, the comptroller's continuing concern that a
settlement in one case may create adverse precedent in another case is
likely to continue to make settlement of some cases more difficult than
the facts or dollars involved would indicate. On the other hand, now that
the comptroller has increased authority to settle, that authority may en-
able taxpayers and comptrollers to settle cases on a more frequent and
faster basis than in the past.
Another set of provisions in the new legislation concerns tax auditing
and collection procedures. This new legislation, contained in Senate Bill
1319, allows certain companies to conduct managed sales tax audits, 370
365. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.064 (Vernon Supp. 2000).
366. See id. § 111.060.
367. See id. § 111.064(c).
368. See id. § 111.101.
369. Id. See also § 111.102 (extending the comptroller's authority to settle cases on
redetermination to include cases in which the tax due exceeds $1,000).




use percentage-based reporting to calculate sales tax liabilities,37' and use
sampling techniques to calculate refunds on overpaid taxes. 372
Another campaign promise by Comptroller Rylander had been to
make the hearings process more accessible to taxpayers. Although the
comptroller has offices around the state, hearings have traditionally been
held in Austin. Hearings may now be held in other cities. While it re-
mains to be seen how many sophisticated taxpayers will prefer venues
outside of Austin, several hearings have already been held in other cities,
indicating that at least some taxpayers prefer home to Austin. 373
D. A WORD 37 4 ABOUT PENALTIES
In many respects, the Annual Survey period marked great progress to-
wards Comptroller Carole Keeton Rylander's repeated promise that
Texas taxpayers will not be treated as second-class citizens, and the comp-
troller and her staff are to be commended for this progress. As the comp-
troller continues to seek (and even more importantly, consider seriously)
recommendations from various committees, including the Taxpayer Advi-
sory Group and the Electronic Technology Advisory Group, the comp-
troller will be asked to analyze more carefully the instances in which
penalty is imposed in sales and franchise tax audits. The aggressive na-
ture with which certain auditors and hearings attorneys pursue penalties
is evidenced by the number of cases in which penalty appears to be im-
posed simply because the taxpayer 375 is a large, sophisticated entity, as
well as by the number of cases in which taxpayers with seemingly good
reporting history must resort to an administrative hearing in order to
have penalty waived. 376
371. See id. § 151.4171.
372. See id. § 151.4330.
373. The Legislature made several other changes to various provisions of the Tax Code
that deal with procedure. For example, "tax" was defined in new sectionl01.003(13) as "a
tax, fee, assessment, charge, or other amount that the comptroller is authorized to adminis-
ter;" the record maintenance requirement was amended to clarify that it prevails over any
other conflicting state taxation provision, including section 191.024(b), which was formerly
excluded; new section 111.0041(b); and new section 111.023(b) which permits an officer,
director, or employee of the taxpayer whose duties include administering the taxpayer's
rights and responsibilities with the comptroller to sign a written authorization for a repre-
sentative of the taxpayer to submit a report or other document. New § 111.023(c) permits
the comptroller to impose a similar requirement for assignment of a claim for refund.
374. Actually, an entire paragraph.
375. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CoDE § 3.5(c)(4) (listing "size and sophistication of the tax-
payer" as one (but only one) of several factors to be taken into account in determining
whether penalties should be waived).
376. See, e.g., Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing No. 36,680 (Jan. 15, 1999) (waiving pen-
alty for taxpayer who was 98.69% accurate when reporting and remitting sales taxes on
sales made during the audit period); Tex. Comp. Pub. Acc'ts, Hearing 37,743 (Jan. 27,
1999) (penalty waived for taxpayer whose overall reporting and remitting on sales and
purchases was 99.88% accurate). In both of these cases, the tax division relied in part on
reporting error rates with respect to only a portion of the audit (e.g., purchases, rather than
overall sales tax reported). Perhaps future cases and administrative guidance will give
credence to the very reasonable approaches taken by the administrative law judges in these




Texas legislators and other policy makers continue to work during this
interim period to address issues raised by recent legislation and to con-
sider additional legislative proposals for the 2001 session. In some re-
spects, the issues are familiar (how to balance local jurisdictions' needs
with tax incentives). In other areas, particularly with respect to electronic
commerce, the issue may be familiar, but the context has changed dra-
matically in only a handful of years. As working on the comptroller's
electronic commerce and technology advisory group has made clear, it's a
changing world, and Texas tax laws must (and will) change too.
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